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1. Introduction 
The United States currently recognizes over 560 indigenous groups for purposes of 
“government-to-government” relationships. Of these 560, 334 are Indian nations, bands, 
communities, tribes, and pueblos and 226 are Alaskan Native villages and corporations (Porter 
1997, 74). To be acknowledged by the United States federal government, Native groups must 
meet set criteria and register with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. To be eligible: 
(a) The petitioner has been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially 
continuous basis since 1900… 
(b) A predominant portion of the petitioning group comprises a distinct community and 
has existed as a community from historical times until the present… 
(c) The petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its members as an 
autonomous entity from historical times until the present… 
(d) A copy of the group’s present governing document including its membership criteria. 
In the absence of a written document, the petitioner must provide a statement describing 
in full its membership criteria and current governing procedures… 
(e) The petitioner’s membership consists of individuals who descend from a historical 
Indian tribe or from historian Indian tribes which combined and functioned as a single 
autonomous political entity… 
(f) The membership of the petitioning group is composed principally of persons who are 
not members of any acknowledged North American Indian tribe… 
(g) Neither the petitioner nor its members are the subject of congressional legislation that 
has expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal relationship. (5 CFR Part 83 §83.7, 
1994) 
 
That Tribal Nations require recognition and registration with the United States Department of 
Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs speaks to a larger legacy of colonialism responsible for 
the mass killing and forced relocation of Native peoples. Through the combined forces of factors 
such as diseases carried by European settlers, military conquest, Manifest Destiny policies to 
gain control of American soil from “sea-to-shining-sea,” the Trail of Tears, and a litany of 
others, overwhelming numbers of indigenous people were killed. The United States Department 
of the Interior in 1894 estimated that 30,000 Indians died in the wars fought between 1789 and 
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1846 alone, while noting that because of difficulties acquiring the data a “safe estimate” is fifty 
percent greater, for a total of 45,000 Indian lives lost (637-638). 
 Since those times, the relationship between Tribal Nations and the United States has 
evolved dramatically. Following the legal practices that established the modern territorial 
boundaries and jurisdictions of tribal reservations, modern efforts have begun shifting some legal 
control and authority back to tribal populations, as a means to promote greater “self-
determination” (Royster 2008, 1068). However, the common connection between both the 
original denial of political legitimacy as well recent trends to return governance powers back to 
Native peoples is the notion of “sovereignty.” Sovereignty as a concept structures all 
“government-to-government” relations between Native peoples and the United States because it 
provides the legal and philosophical foundation for what even constitutes a legitimate 
government.  
Sovereignty is most commonly understood by Western political theorists as the origin of 
political legitimacy. Sovereignty serves to divide collections of people into independent political 
units, protect those units from encroachment by other powers, and provide an identifiable “locus 
of power” in the form of governments that serve as the reference point for government-to-
government interactions (Hannum 1998, 488). In one sense, sovereignty is a term that speaks to 
“metapolitical authority,” the very “ability to define the content and scope of ‘law’ and 
‘politics.’” Simultaneously, sovereignty functions as an empty term that has no determinate 
meaning outside of political struggles between groups of people (Rifkin 2009, 90-91).  
Since the first encounters with Native peoples, European powers have struggled with 
classifying the political legitimacy of Native peoples despite entering into political engagements 
and agreements with them, primarily through land titles and treaties. Between 1778 and 1868 
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alone, the United States ratified 367 Indian treaties (Prucha 1994, 1). These treaties originated 
from the same political tradition of European powers employing treaties as a means of 
recognizing and engaging each other. Yet, over time Native peoples took an ever-changing legal 
status that makes their position distinct, “peculiar,” and unlike any other political entity (Rifkin 
2009, 89). As a result, the question of the “sovereignty” of Native peoples relative to the 
“sovereignty” of the United States consistently comes into question, sparking legal battles fought 
over the dimensions and aspects of each entity’s respective sovereignty. 
 This study aims to examine some of the complexities of this relationship through an 
analysis of how historical and more modern American and Native political texts define and 
invoke sovereignty. By examining a series of major Supreme Court opinions and Native political 
texts that explicitly aim to define sovereignty, this study will seek to clarify if there are 
significant gaps or differences within the shared political vocabulary of sovereignty. By 
employing a grounded theoretical analysis that examines trends in definitions amongst individual 
instances in which authors define “sovereignty” and its characteristics, this study will propose 
that there are salient differences in meanings of the same words that can help account for some 
political difficulties and struggles witnessed and waged by Native populations today. 
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2. Literature Review and Historical Background 
[T]here exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than 
that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when 
it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning 
which was universally agreed upon.  
     Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise Vol. 1 
 
Sovereignty as a concept in modern debates and historical analysis is both vaguely 
understood and taken for granted. Before examining individual Native texts and Supreme Court 
decisions, it is necessary to provide some historical background from where sovereignty as a 
basis for political authority originated (Jackson 1999, 435). This chapter will provide a brief 
historical outline that many scholars have traced of the origins of “sovereignty” as a political 
paradigm through shifts in European political traditions beginning in the Middle Ages. This 
historical outline is not meant to be comprehensive, nor in strict chronological order, as no 
history can ever be presented as such. Instead, this historical outline is meant to point to major 
historical trends in how “sovereignty” was viewed that had significant impacts on the formation 
of the American legal tradition and relations between Native peoples and the United States.  I 
will then consider how this series of transformations points to the importance of engaging in 
qualitative analysis of writings about sovereignty as it is deployed by both Native peoples and 
the fundamental cases addressing sovereignty by the United States Supreme Court. 
 
2.1. The European Tradition of Sovereignty 
 Many theorists such as Oppenheimer, Schmitt, and Wight loosely trace the origins of 
“sovereignty” as a paradigm to Europe. Following their analysis, I divide the European tradition 
into four major historical periods, each marked by a distinct conception of political authority: 
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rule by the Church under the paradigm of respublica Christiana, European statehood 
exemplified by the Peace of Westphalia, imperial sovereignty, and the emergence of “popular 
sovereignty” which gave birth to the United States. I will describe each in brief detail below. 
  
2.1.1. The Church and Sovereignty: respublica Christiana 
Before sovereignty had entered into the political lexicon of European powers, there were not 
clear divisions between territorial and political boundaries, nor between the origins of political 
power within powers. Instead, during the Middle Ages (5
th
-15
th
 centuries) political life and 
private life were in many ways collapsed. For example, the extent of a King’s political realm and 
jurisdiction was simultaneously his private property. Feudalism as an economic and political 
system did not lend itself to drawing clear demarcations between political authority and instead 
produced “overlapping and constantly shifting Lordships” (Jackson 1999, 435). Notably, these 
powers and Lordships did not necessarily recognize each other politically (Croxton 1999, 571). 
At this time, the only power described as “sovereign” was the Judeo-Christian God, whose 
decrees and principles demanded strict obedience by Christians. This association of sovereignty 
with the “higher authority” of Christianity fell under the paradigm of respublica Christiana, 
which Jackson defines as: 
The notion that secular authorities no less than spiritual authorities were subjects of a higher 
authority, God, whose commandments were expressed by the precepts of Christianity. Both 
secular and religious authorities were Christ's subjects and servants…In short, if there was a 
`sovereign state' in medieval Europe, it was the Christian empire… (1999, 436) 
 
Respublica Christiana wedded political authority and religious authority into a joint structure 
embodied in the organization of the Holy Roman Empire headed by both the pope and the 
emperor, which at the end of the Middle Ages was the head of the Habsburg dynasty. In this 
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model, sovereignty was not earthly in the sense that it could belong or originate in a particular 
European power; instead, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope were charged with actualizing 
God’s divine sovereignty on Earth (Croxton 1999, 571; Jackson 1999, 436).  
 Near the end of this period, a multi-state system began to emerge as powers consolidated 
and particular dynasties such as those in England and France began to take power. This shift to 
multiple loci of power did not destroy the paradigm of respublica Christiana on its own. If 
anything, during the 14
th
 century the papacy attempted to further expand its political authority 
and what it could lay claim to as God’s “single earthly representative” (Croxton 1999, 571). In 
order to transition to locating political authority elsewhere in the popular imaginations of 
European powers, the power of the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire had to first be 
challenged philosophically as well as politically.    
 
2.1.2. The Peace of Westphalia 
Many scholars trace sovereignty’s emergence, or at least its practical establishment in 
European international politics, to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Hannum 1998, 487). The 
Peace of Westphalia is the common name provided for a series of treaties signed in Münster and 
Osnabrück in 1648 to end the Thirty Years War fought originally along religious lines between 
Protestants and Catholics but which expanded to engulf much of Central Europe (Croxton 1999, 
569). In addition to a complicated series of land title transfers that occurred between the Holy 
Roman Empire, Sweden, and France, the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück were significant 
because they included explicit recognition of Protestantism, the Christian sect that arose in 
opposition to the Catholic tradition of the Holy Roman Empire (Croxton 1999, 571-572). This 
placed the Treaties in line with other events of that period that sought to undermine the influence 
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of the Holy Roman Empire, such as King Henry VIII’s divorce of Catherine of Aragon that, 
symbolically and literally, served to divorce English rule from respublica Christiana and shift 
English politics away from papal authority (Jackson 1999, 438).  
Scholars such as Croxton have noted, however, this portrayal of the Peace of Westphalia 
marking the “end of the era” of Christian political authority is historically misguided or at least 
incomplete. One primary contention opposing the traditional narrative of the Peace of 
Westphalia as the “dawn of sovereignty” is that it didn’t actually end the Holy Roman Empire, 
which continued to maintain strong political influence for another 158 years (1999, 573). In 
addition, while the treaties had thoroughly detailed clauses related to property ownership and 
political jurisdiction to avoid misinterpretations and loopholes in land title transfers, the terms 
used to describe the political authority of involved parties were frequently vague. These vague 
terms lead scholars to acknowledge the treaties were not in great part about recognizing the 
“sovereignty” of England, France, Sweden, or Spain, but instead point to a variety of kinds of 
authorities (Croxton 1999, 576-580). Finally, it is difficult to describe the Peace of Westphalia as 
ushering in a new era of multi-lateral engagement and mutual recognition between sovereign 
powers. The Peace of Westphalia did not involve multilateral treaties, but instead a series of 
bilateral treaties that did not recognize the signatories as political equals (Croxton 1999, 582).  
However, a conservative interpretation might point the Peace of Westphalia as merely 
symptomatic of a larger collection of shifts in how political actions became justified during the 
17
th
 century. During this same time, political theorists shifted their descriptions of political 
authority from derivatives of the church towards secular, independent and “sovereign” states that 
are “self-determining” and do not dictate the governmental organizations of other similarly 
independent states (Jackson 1999, 438-439). For example, Jackson and Potter both note that 
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“sovereignty” as a specific term first entered into French political theory through Jean Bodin’s 
1576 political treatise Les six livres de la Republique (Jackson 1999, 439; Potter 2002, 16). 
While the Westphalian treaties themselves relied on the political language of the Medieval 
tradition under respublica Christiana, there are notable shifts in how European powers interacted 
with each other outside of the terms of Christendom (Jackson 1999, 438-439).  
 
2.1.3. Imperial Sovereignty 
 The principles of political organization in Europe underwent another shift in the 
development of “imperial sovereignty” that served to legitimize colonial expansion by European 
powers including Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal. As Jackson explains: 
When a government exercises supreme authority over a foreign territory that government 
can be said to possess imperial sovereignty. A foreign territory is somebody else's 
homeland. Imperial sovereignty is thus a denial of local sovereignty in foreign countries. 
Sovereignty gave imperial states independent status in their foreign territories while 
simultaneously imposing a dependent status on the populations of those same territories. 
(1999, 441) 
 
European states drew upon significantly older legal traditions, such as the ancient Roman 
doctrine of terra nullis, or conquest of land, to legitimate the establishment of settlements and 
colonies. As substantial colonial enterprises were developed through the world, including in the 
Americas, Asia, Africa, and Australia, sovereignty came to be “understood as a distinctly 
European institution.” European states agreed to recognize each other’s claims to foreign 
territory as legitimate conquests while also refusing to recognize non-European political 
authority (Jackson 1999, 442-443).  
 Colonization and empire-building had begun before the end of the Peace of Westphalia. 
During the 16
th
 century, the Church legitimized colonial acquisition, such as the papal sanctions 
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issued to Portugal and Spain for the acquisition and division of what is modern day North 
America. However, in the years following the Peace of Westphalia, secular political 
authorizations arose that massively increased the scope of colonialism. For example, Great 
Britain began to provide royal charters to companies such as the East Indian Company and the 
Hudson’s Bay Company as the basis for acquiring land, beginning a larger network of colonies 
promoting inter- and intra-national trade (Jackson 1999, 442).  
  European states’ rationales for colonialism did only focus on the material gains provided 
by new access to resources and expanding markets. Instead, colonial efforts were increasingly 
justified by appeals to paternalistic attitudes; namely, that non-European populations required 
the assistance and education of European powers, who are obligated to assist in “civilizing” local 
populations (Jackson 1999, 443). As will be discussed below, this particular justification found 
its way into American relations with Native peoples. 
  
2.1.4. Popular Sovereignty and the American Revolution 
The final notable shift in political conceptions of sovereignty that arose within Europe was 
the principle of popular sovereignty; namely, that a political power derives its authority from the 
will and consent of a people in a territory, not its ruler. The rise of liberalism in the 18
th
 century, 
with its emphasis on freedom and autonomy as political ideals, made it increasingly difficult to 
justify colonial claims to foreign territory and populations even in benevolent and paternalist 
terms. Representative theories of sovereignty and political authority gradually unseated dominant 
autocratic and imperial conceptions of sovereignty (Jackson 1999, 444). The practical result of 
the growing influence of popular sovereignty was increased political resistance and revolutions 
against perceived tyranny and autocracy, such as the Glorious Revolution of 17
th
 century 
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England (Wight 1977, 159), the French Revolution of the late 18
th
 century (Jackson 1999, 444), 
and the American Revolution of 1765 (Grey 1978, 888-893). 
In the American case, the works of thinkers such as Thomas Paine and John Locke inspired 
resistance against British colonial rule by popularizing the idea that a people always have the 
“Supreme Power” to overthrow a government that is superior to the power of any individual 
ruler, including the King of England (Kalyvas 2005, 226). The Declaration of Independence 
makes this principle explicit by defending “the Right of the People to alter or to abolish [any 
government], and to institute new Government” should they choose (1776). In the aftermath of 
the American Revolution, the efforts of political thinkers such as Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, 
and James Madison ensured continued debates and focus on popular sovereignty as a founding 
legal principle for the United States (Deudney 196, 197). The centrality of popular sovereignty as 
a legal principle is evident in the preamble of the United States Constitution (1787) in that “the 
People of the United States” have the ultimate authority to establish both the Constitution as well 
as the United States as a sovereign power (Jackson 1999, 444).  
 
2.2. The American Tradition of Sovereignty 
 The founding of the United States following the American Revolution dramatically 
altered the relationship between the former British colonists and Native peoples occupying 
nearby territory. Colonists had previously encountered Native peoples prior to their 
independence from Great Britain; notably, during the French and Indian War whose aftermath 
and resulting taxation upon the colonies was a major impetus for independence. However, this 
section will focus on the founding documents of the United States as a separate political 
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“sovereign” and how that impacted further relations with Native peoples, including significant 
Supreme Court decisions.  
 
2.2.1. America’s Founding Documents 
 As previously mentioned, the members of the Continental Congress of 1776 that drafted 
the Declaration of Independence as well as members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
drew on political precedents and lessons from the European state system to draft their political 
principle. In establishing a federal system of divided power and semi-autonomous states, 
American political thinkers sought to correct the witnessed failures of Europe, namely political 
infighting, while providing a clear grounding for political authority and its exercise (Jackson 
1999, 449).  
Notably, both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution do not define the 
political authority of the United States federal government in terms of “sovereignty.” However, 
there are clear traces of popular sovereignty in their writings. For example, the Declaration of 
Independence explicitly defines governments as “instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed” (1776). In defining the specific powers and scope of 
the newly formed government, reference to Native peoples is notably scarce, despite 
approximately 200 years of previous interactions leading up to the writing of the Constitution. 
There are three explicit and implicit references to Native peoples in the Constitution that are 
worth examining.  
First, the infamous “3/5ths Compromise” clause that establishes how individual states 
may count citizens to determine representation within the House of Representatives contains an 
often-overlooked reference to Native peoples that excludes them from calculations of 
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representation because they are not taxed. This provision functionally excludes Native peoples 
from the definition of the United States population represented by the Constitution. The clause in 
its entirety states that: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which 
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons. (1787, Article I, Section 2, emphasis my own) 
 
 Second, the Commerce Clause, found in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution which 
enumerates the specific powers of Congress, states that Congress has the power “To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes” 
(1787). This clause is notable because it draws an explicit distinction between the power of 
Congress to regulate commerce with “foreign nations” and with “Indian tribes.” This single line 
was foundational in the Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) decision that will be discussed 
below. 
 Finally, the Supremacy Clause, which establishes the Constitution as the “supreme law of 
the land,” references the authority and legally binding nature of treaties. Notably, the clause 
states that: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. (1787, Article VI, emphasis my own) 
 
Wildenthal notes that this language is significant in that it makes clear that it is referring to 
treaties that were ratified under the “authority of the United States” but prior to the ratification of 
the Constitution which legally founded the United States, such as the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell – 
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one of seven treaties with Indian tribes that was ratified after American independence but prior to 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 (2003, 8).  
 Despite the importance of each of these references for understanding the United States’ 
orientation towards Native peoples in regards to perceived sovereignty, it is notable that 
American Indians were not parties to the convention. As Wildenthal notes: 
Like women and African Americans, [the Indians] had no voice in framing or agreeing to the 
founding documents of the United States. Indeed, one finds in the Constitution, as in the 
Articles of Confederation before it, no explicit recognition of the tribes as a part of our 
governmental structure and little mention of them at all. But the Indians, like the African 
slaves who were subjected to the Constitution’ fugitive slave clause … were not ignored 
altogether. (Wildenthal 2003, 6-7) 
 
 
2.2.2. Early American Relations with Indians 
As previously mentioned, interactions between the United States and Native peoples was 
primarily codified in the form of treaties, with 367 individual treaties ratified between 1778 and 
1868 (Prucha 1994, 1). These treaties not only altered the material distribution of resources and 
power between Native peoples and the United States but also functioned as an “inclusive 
exclusion” of forms of Native political organization. While treaties were used to simultaneously 
recognize (to some degree) the political legitimacy of particular groups of Native peoples, these 
treaties also relied on forcing indigenous forms of governance to make themselves 
understandable or conform to American standards of what constitutes “government” or a proper 
political representative of a tribal nation (Rifkin 2009, 89-96). This process is notable because 
while these treaties operated to help establish and resolve questions of jurisdiction, national 
boundaries, or legal control and status of people within territories, it also served to define Native 
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peoples by what they “categorically lack,” namely a political and governmental organization 
understandable by the United States (Rifkin 2009, 89).  
This resulted in a fundamental philosophical and legal contradiction; engaging in treaties 
with the United States meant that Native peoples gained political recognition in terms of their 
collective organization and territory at the same time treaties defined the United States as having 
the “ultimate title to the land” (Rifkin 2009, 96). This legal distinction became the foundation for 
future legal disputes that shape American Indian law.  
This study will now consider a select few Supreme Court cases that demonstrate the legacy 
of this American understanding of sovereignty. While the individual definitions of sovereignty 
contained within these decisions will be examined in greater detail in the qualitative content 
analysis, this section will focus on the place of these Supreme Court decisions within the larger 
historical narrative of sovereignty and the effects these decisions had on the conditions of Native 
peoples. 
 
2.2.3. The Marshall Trilogy and Trail of Tears 
The “Marshall Trilogy” refers to three Supreme Court decisions under Chief Justice John 
Marshall that set the foundation of interactions between tribal nations and the United States; 
Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia 
(1832) (Eaglewoman 2012, 671). Collectively, these three cases established the legal precedent 
for understanding the United States has having “overriding sovereignty” over tribal nations, as 
each case dealt explicitly with the definition of “sovereignty.”  
Johnson v. M’Intosh, short for Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh (21 U.S. 8 Wheat. 
543), concerned the legality of property purchases and agreements between private individuals 
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and tribal nations. Thomas Johnson had bought land from the Piankeshaw Indians in 1775, and 
the plaintiffs were lessees of his descendants. The defendant, William M’Intosh, purchased tracts 
of land in 1818 that supposedly came from the same territory (Johnson v. M’Intosh, 555-561). In 
the majority opinion, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that private parties may not purchase land 
from tribal nations because the United States federal government has the sole authority to do so.  
Chief Justice’s Marshall’s majority opinion includes a history of European colonization of 
the Americas, the competition and cooperation between states such as Great Britain, Portugal, 
France, Holland, and Spain, and how each came to acquire foreign territory, and how that 
territory potentially changed ownership because of treaties. Chief Justice Marshall uses this 
history in order to define the origin and legal justifications of the “Discovery Doctrine” (Johnson 
v. M’Intosh 546-548). The Discovery Doctrine is the legal principle that: 
…discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects or by whose authority it was 
made against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by 
possession. The exclusion of all other Europeans necessarily gave to the nation making the 
discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements 
upon it. It was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. (Johnson v. M’Intosh, 572-
573, emphasis my own) 
 
Thus, because of the United States “discovery” of this particular territory held by a tribal, or at 
least so Chief Justice Marshall states, the result is that: 
The United States…maintain, as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive 
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either by purchase or by conquest, and gave 
also a right to such a degree of sovereignty as the circumstances of the people would allow 
them to exercise. (Johnson v. M’Intosh, 587, emphasis my own) 
 
 Chief Justice Marshall’s decision not only provided a historical and legal foundation for 
the United States to have this exclusive authority to acquire territory, but it defined this right to 
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acquire territory as, by its very nature, superseding and “diminishing” the sovereignty of Native 
peoples. According to the Discovery Doctrine: 
… the rights of the original inhabitants were in no instance entirely disregarded, but were 
necessarily to a considerable extent impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful 
occupants of the soil … but their rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations were 
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will to 
whomsoever they pleased was denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery 
gave exclusive title to those who made it. (Johnson v. M’Intosh, 574, emphasis my own) 
 
 
Moreover, Chief Justice’s Marshalls decision directly imports the paternalist and racist language 
of the legacy of British colonialism. The Discovery Doctrine is justified not only legally, but 
ethically, due to the very nature of Native peoples themselves as “fierce savages,” as he writes: 
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages whose occupation was 
war and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of 
their country was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a distinct people was 
impossible because they were as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were 
ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence. (Johnson v. M’Intosh, 590) 
 
Statements like these through Chief Justice Marshall’s decision provide an important frame for 
American Indian policy; the ability to limit tribal sovereignty derives not merely from actual 
legal documentation, but instead from racist conceptions of Native peoples undeserving of equal 
political consideration as other European powers (Eaglewoman 2012, 694). 
 Two major events happened in the years immediately following Johnson v. M’Intosh. 
First, gold was discovered on Cherokee lands in 1828. This resulted in Georgia, Alabama, and 
Mississippi seeking to gain jurisdiction over Cherokee lands. Second, in 1830, Congress passed 
the Indian Removal Act. In writing, the act did not negate any treaties, and was a voluntary offer 
for “such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange the lands where they now 
reside” for lands west of the Mississippi (411-412). Contrary to popular belief, the law itself did 
not include any provisions allowing use of military force by President Jackson against Native 
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peoples, but simply allowed the President to negotiate for these land exchanges (Cave 2003, 
1330). However, the act foreshadowed Andrew Jackson’s intent of ridding the eastern United 
States of Indian inhabitants. 
 The discovery of gold on Cherokee lands led to the second of the three Marshall Trilogy 
cases, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831). The state of Georgia had passed an act to seize 
control “of the gold and silver and other mines lying and being in that section of the chartered 
limits of Georgia, commonly called the Cherokee country,” which the Cherokee Nation 
challenged in court (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 75-76). This legal dispute did not challenge 
federal authority over the land, but individual state authority to control native land (Wildenthal 
2003, 8-9). Relying on the precedent set by Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Cherokee Nation sought to 
prove that Georgia had no right to seize the land because only the federal government has that 
authority. Once again delivering the majority opinion, Chief Justice Marshalled the Court would 
not hear the case on its merits because the Court lacked jurisdiction given the Cherokee Nation 
could not be deemed a “foreign nation” (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 15-16).  
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion relied on conceptualizing the sovereignty of the 
Cherokee Nation in terms of both their territorial occupation relative to the United States as well 
as their relationship to the United States. Chief Justice Marshall notes that, “the relation of the 
Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere 
else,” drawing an explicit distinction between the situation of Native peoples and other peoples 
deemed “foreign nations”  (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 16). Chief Justice Marshall made this 
distinction explicit by redefining the Cherokee Nation: 
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore 
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a 
voluntary cession to our government, yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes 
which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict 
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accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a 
title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their 
right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the 
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. (17, emphasis my own) 
 
This excerpt represents the primary legal precedents for the “Trust Doctrine” which 
establishes a duty on the United States federal government to protect Native peoples. This 
“protection” includes administering tribal lands, approving tribal government decisions, and 
providing and funding basic services to Native peoples (Eaglewoman 2012, 679). By defining 
tribes as a “ward” of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall articulates the legal and moral 
principles for federal control over Native people’s land and government. The further implication 
is that the United States serves as the political representative for all international law principles, 
as they are under the governing authority of the United States (Barker 2005, 11).  
Chief Justice Marshall further draws evidence that Native peoples do not constitute 
“foreign nations” by drawing on the distinction made in the commerce clause between “foreign 
nations” and “Indian tribes.” The majority opinion does acknowledge that the Cherokee legally 
constitute a “distinct political society” that is “capable of managing its own affairs and governing 
itself.” However, by itself, this is not enough to overcome the legal distinctions in the 
Constitution between the legal status of Indian tribes and foreign nations. For Chief Justice 
Marshall, that this distinction ultimately results in a “peculiar” understanding of the relations 
between the United States and Indians is not enough to overcome the plain wording of the 
commerce clause that, as part of the supreme law of the land, takes legal precedent (Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 16-17). 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia included four opinions; Chief Justice Marshall’s majority 
opinion, Justice Thompson’s dissenting opinion, Justice Johnson’s separate opinion, and Justice 
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Baldwin’s separate opinion. The latter three were included in this study as they each take 
different views on the scope of Native sovereignty. However, within Chief Justice Marshall’s 
majority opinion, the term “sovereignty” appears only once. This reference not only is exclusive 
to the United States’ sovereignty, but more significantly continues the pattern of paternalist 
justifications for Supreme Court decisions: 
 [The Indians] look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; 
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their Great Father. They and 
their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so 
completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States that any attempt to 
acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as 
an invasion of our territory and an act of hostility. (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 17-18) 
 
In plain language, Chief Justice Marshall represents Naïve peoples as reliant and demanding 
federal involvement, and yet fails to quote a Native person anywhere in his decision. 
 The final case composing the Marshall Trilogy is Worcester v. Georgia (1832). Samuel 
Worcester was an American missionary who was a resident of the Cherokee Nation. He was 
indicted by the state of Georgia for violating a law that prohibited non-Indians from occupying 
Cherokee Nation land without a license or permit from the state of Georgia (515-516). In the 
majority opinion, Chief Justice Marshall declared the Georgia laws unconstitutional on the 
grounds that they “impair the obligation of the various contracts” (539). In doing so, the opinion 
further solidified the principal that the federal government had sole authority over Indian tribes. 
 The decision in Worcester v. Georgia is a double-edged sword. In some respects, the case 
represented a legal victory for the Cherokee Nation. Marshall set a legal precedent both against 
state control over Indian tribes as well as for interpreting Native people’s treaty rights generously 
and “strictly against the unnecessary erosion of tribal sovereignty,” a principle known as the 
“canons of construction” (Wildenthal 2003, 9).  
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For example, Marshall notes that: 
To construe the expression "managing all their affairs" into a surrender of self-
government would be a perversion of their necessary meaning, and a departure from the 
construction which has been uniformly put on them…Is it credible that they could have 
considered themselves as surrendering to the United States the right to dictate their future 
cessions and the terms on which they should be made, or to compel their submission to 
the violence of disorderly and licentious intruders? It is equally inconceivable that they 
could have supposed themselves, by a phrase thus slipped into an article on another and 
mere interesting subject, to have divested themselves of the right of self-government on 
subjects not connected with trade. (Worcester v. Georgia, 518-519) 
 
More significantly, Marshall provides the legal argument that “that a weaker power does not 
surrender its independence – its right to self-government – by associating with a stronger and 
taking protection.” Noting that feudal states “do not thereby cease to be sovereign and 
independent states,” Marshall explicitly connects this relationship to the Cherokee Nation as a 
defense against encroachment by the state of Georgia (Worcester v. Georgia, 520).  
 However, in striking down the authority of the states over Native peoples, Marshall also 
explicitly elevated the power of the federal government over them. The formulation of the 
Cherokee Nation’s right to self-government is still mediated by federal control. Immediately 
following his explanation that treaties of protection do not divest Native peoples of their right to 
self-government, he notes that: 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with 
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and 
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole 
intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, 
vested in the Government of the United States. (Worcester v. Georgia, 520) 
 
Thus, in a single opinion, Marshal provided a paradox of legal precedent which seemed to at 
least imply some notion of sovereignty, or at least self-government, held by Native peoples, 
while simultaneously denying that this authority overrides federal control.  
 26 
While Worcester v. Georgia laid the foundation for a potentially more hospitable 
engagement between tribal nations and the United States, the immediate aftermath of the 
decision was hardly an example. President Andrew Jackson was furious with the decision, and it 
did not enforce its mandates (Barker 2005, 13). Instead, President Jackson accelerated the forced 
relocation of Indian tribes through the use of “fraud, coercion, corruption, malfeasance both in 
the negotiation of removal treaties and in their execution” (Cave 2003, 1337). The ultimate result 
was the cession of all Cherokee land east of the Mississippi and a 1,000 mile-long march 
westward of 16,000 Cherokees in an event the Cherokee call Nunna dual Tsunyi, commonly 
translated as the “Trail of Tears” (Bowes 2007, 69).1 
 
2.2.4. Oliphant v. The Suquamish Indian Tribe and United States v. Wheeler 
 This study will also consider two other Supreme Court cases in the legacy of decisions 
relating to tribal sovereignty. Unlike many other cases which are identified as having practical 
effects on sovereignty, Oliphant v. The Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) and United States v. 
Wheeler (1978) both directly spoke to the definition of tribal sovereignty by addressing the 
effects of a tribal nations legal status on its criminal jurisdiction. These decisions are also 
important because they demonstrate the lasting effects of the Marshall Trilogy which were cited 
throughout the opinions of both decisions. 
 In Oliphant v. The Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978), Mark Oliphant was a non-Indian 
resident of the Port Madison reservation who assaulted a tribal officer and resisted arrest. He 
sought a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the tribe lacked jurisdiction to try him as he 
                                                 
1
 The Cherokee were not the only tribe relocated westward. The Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles 
were also forced to relocate. See (Bowes 2007, 75) 
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was a non-Indian (Oliphant v. The Suquamish Indian Tribe, 194-195). Justice Rehnquist 
delivered the majority opinion ruling against the Suquamish Indian Tribe on the grounds that 
they lacked jurisdiction to try non-Indians because of what Eaglewoman calls the “implicit 
divestiture doctrine” (2012, 689). The “implicit divestiture doctrine” is the legal principle that, 
“Upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under 
the territorial  sovereignty of the United States, and their exercise of separate power is 
constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding  sovereignty” (Oliphant vs. 
The Suquamish Indian Tribe, 203).  
The implication of this doctrine is that sovereign powers can be divested from Indian tribes, 
not just by treaty provisions or Congressional restrictions, but also from two other implicit legal 
sources. First, “unspoken assumption[s]” such as “Indian tribal courts were without jurisdiction 
to try non-Indians” may be used to divest sovereign powers (Oliphant vs. The Suquamish Indian 
Tribe 209). Second, Indian nations can be denied sovereign powers if the court deems those 
powers “inconsistent with their status” (Oliphant vs. The Suquamish Indian Tribe 208). These 
two non-statutory and non-treaty based means of diversity sovereign powers of Indian tribes lead 
Justice Rehnquist to explicitly re-define Indian tribes as “quasi-sovereign entities” (Oliphant vs. 
The Suquamish Indian Tribe 196). This stark re-defining and vague political theory might best be 
described as what Mark Rifkin deems an “inclusive exclusion;” Native peoples are bought into 
the terms of sovereignty only enough such that they can be selectively excluded when needed 
due to implicit explanations of the differences of Native peoples from all other political entities 
within American law (2009, 90).  
A mere sixteen days later, United States v. Wheeler (1978) was before the Supreme Court 
to test the precedent set by Oliphant v. The Suquamish Tribe by applying that decision to the 
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concept of “double jeopardy.” Double jeopardy is the legal principle that an individual cannot be 
charge and tried for the same crime twice, and is found in the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution (1791). In United States v. Wheeler, a Navajo Tribe member had been charged for 
an offense in both tribal and federal courts. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed 
the case on the grounds that “since ‘Indian tribal courts and United States district courts are not 
arms of separate sovereigns,’ the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the respondent's trial” (United 
States v. Wheeler 316). Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Stewart reversed the Court of 
Appeals ruling and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not apply. Justice Stewart ruled that 
Indian tribal courts and the United States federal courts belong to two separate sovereigns, and 
that Indian tribes retain the inherent power within their sovereignty to charge and try members of 
their own nation (United States v. Wheeler 319-320).  
 
2.2.5. Summary of Supreme Court Decisions 
In conclusion, each of these cases addresses a separate legal question regarding the scope 
and character of tribal sovereignty. First, Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823) addressed the power of 
Native peoples to engage in binding legal agreements; the Court ruled that the United States 
federal government has the exclusive right to purchase or acquire land from Native peoples 
based on the “Discovery Doctrine,” negating all agreements between private individuals and 
tribal nations. Second, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1832) addressed the legal status of Native 
peoples; the Court found that Native peoples do not constitute “foreign nations” but are instead 
“domestic dependent nations” that rely on the United States federal government to manage their 
affairs. Third, Worcester v. Georgia (1832) addressed the degree to which Native peoples are 
protected from interference in their affairs by external powers; the Court struck down state laws 
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seizing Cherokee territory, but in doing so affirmed the overriding control of the federal 
government over tribal land. Finally, Oliphant v. The Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) and United 
States v. Wheeler (1978) each defined the legal jurisdiction of tribal nations to try individuals. 
Tribal nations are considered sovereign insofar as they have the right to enforce their own laws 
on their own people, but lack the legal jurisdiction to try non-Native peoples due to “unspoken 
assumptions” about the powers they divested to the federal government.  
Collectively, these cases establish a paradoxical precedent that finds Native peoples as 
“quasi-sovereign,” a flexible legal category that allows the federal government to deny Native 
peoples certain sovereign powers deemed “inconsistent with their legal status” (Oliphant v. The 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 208). This legal reasoning seems to become “fundamentally circular 
and self-validating;” the Supreme Court can appeal to “unspoken assumptions” without clear 
legal precedent to justify a particular interpretation of the United States “overriding sovereignty” 
over Native peoples which then becomes legal precedent for future cases (Rifkin 2009, 91). 
Native peoples’ presence continues to “trouble” United States legal discourses in that their 
“peculiar” and contradictory legal status forces the United States to shift the definition of 
sovereignty to maintain control of Native peoples (Rifkin 2009, 96-7). In being forced to shift 
the definition of sovereignty, the United States Supreme Court potentially demonstrates the 
“groundlessness of U.S. claims” in that the citations of sovereignty used to resolve legal disputes 
with Native peoples are themselves flexible interpretations without any clear legal foundation 
(Rifkin 2009, 113). 
This dynamic prompts a qualitative analysis of the meanings of sovereignty invoked 
throughout the opinions of these cases. If sovereignty acquires meaning through its usage in legal 
discourses, and these legal discourses ultimately structure the present and future relations 
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between Native peoples and the United States, it is necessary to closely analyze how and what 
definitions of sovereignty are used. Analyzing definitions of sovereignty within these major 
Supreme Court decisions, as well as definitions of sovereignty provided by Native peoples, can 
demonstrate potential differences and trends across what seems to be a shared political 
vocabulary. Any differences found across Supreme Court decisions, or in comparing Supreme 
Court decisions to Native text’s defining sovereignty, can help produce possible explanations for 
the recurring legal and material conflicts between Native peoples and the United States. 
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3. Methodology 
 In order to more closely examine the definitions of sovereignty used by the Supreme 
Court decisions and Native peoples’ texts discussed above, this study employs qualitative 
content analysis to analyze individual definitions of sovereignty throughout and across a series of 
texts. Following Hseieh and Shannon, qualitative content analysis is “a research method for the 
subjective interpretation of the content of text data through a systematic classification process of 
coding and identifying themes or patterns” (2005, 1278). Individual instances of definitions of 
sovereignty within the texts are coded and examined to produce a range of definitions and 
aspects of sovereignty. I will examine these instances to derive themes and patterns across texts 
based on common and divergent definitions of sovereignty. Instead of comparing definitions of 
sovereignty on the level of an entire text versus another entire text, this study focuses on 
individual instances within texts. Coding individual instances is necessary to account for 
divergent and multi-faceted understandings of sovereignty within individual texts; categorizing 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) as representing a single definition of sovereignty would 
paper over significant differences in definitions of sovereignty provided by different justices 
within the same decision. 
 
3.1. Grounded Theory  
The specific form of qualitative content analysis employed by this study is grounded 
theory. Grounded theory is defined by Martin and Turner as “an inductive, theory discovery 
methodology that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of 
a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observations of data” (1986, 
141). Grounded theory is best described as both an inductive and abductive method. It is 
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inductive in that it does not rely on hypothesis testing. Unlike some forms of qualitative analysis 
which seek to verify whether or not a trend will be found within a set of texts, my study does not 
test whether or not a particular definition of sovereignty or a particular trend across the texts will 
be found. Instead, my study aims to let the texts “speak for themselves” and allow findings and 
trends to emerge from the texts instead of in comparison to my own personal knowledge or 
background on the subject of sovereignty. This aspect of grounded theory is desirable for my 
research because hypothesis testing in textual analysis can result in confirmation bias that is 
undesirable given that I am analyzing definitions of sovereignty of a cultural group to which I do 
not belong (Charmaz 2008, 155).  
Because data collection and analysis occur simultaneously, abductive inquiry is also 
involved in the process of deriving trends and categories of terms by connecting passages found 
to have similar meanings through “successive levels of data collection and analysis,” and 
drawing potential explanations for those trends (Charmaz 2008, 156-158). The combination of 
these processes in grounded theory allow for flexibility that can account for anomalies and 
complexities that arise while analyzing the texts while accounting for the inevitable role of the 
researcher’s position and interpretation.  
While grounded theory is qualitative in nature, this study also employs measuring 
frequencies of occurrences of passages within each coding category. Grounded theory commonly 
employs a variety of measures such as word counts or frequency of coding categories as a means 
of illustrating trends such as differences in emphasis across texts (Suddaby 2006, 636; Holm et 
al. 2003, 10). Considering the relative frequency of particular definitions of sovereignty from 
amongst Native political texts compared to Supreme Court opinions allows me to draw limited 
conclusions about the relative importance or emphasis of particular definitions of sovereignty for 
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the authors of the examined texts. These quantitative measures serve to complement, but not 
supplant, qualitative observations of the variety of definitions and invocations of sovereignty 
across the texts examined.  
This study’s grounded theory analysis is conducted based on post-positivist assumptions 
about knowledge production and meaning. By this, I mean that, following Denzin and Lincoln, 
while “reality can never be fully apprehended, only approximated,” and that “qualitative research 
is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world,” meaning and reality are not entirely 
constructed (2005). As Alcoff writes: 
To say that location bears on meaning and truth is not the same as saying that location 
determines meaning and truth…To the extent that location is not a fixed essence, and to 
the extent that there is an uneasy, underdetermined, and contested relationship between 
location on the one hand and meaning and truth on the other, we cannot reduce evaluation 
of meaning and truth to a simple identification of the speaker’s location. (1991, 17) 
 
Unlike the “poststructuralist” view that textual meaning is disconnected from the author’s intent, 
or that meaning is strictly a matter of subjective interpretation, texts are analyzed assuming they 
have a clear intent belonging to the authors of those texts. Simultaneously, my access to that 
intent is influenced and highly structured by my position as a researcher and interpreter. While 
this has significant consequences for the reliability and external validity of this study which will 
be described below, it also allows this study to strike an important balance between relativism 
and self-reflexivity. 
 In the context of this study of Native Americans, it is necessary to acknowledge that I as 
a researcher am situated as a White, middle-class, cis-gendered male who has lived on the East 
Coast of the United States my whole life with limited personal interactions with people 
belonging to tribal nations. I do not have the same cultural ties or history of the Indigenous 
authors sampled, such as knowing that my ancestors experienced literal and cultural genocide. In 
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addition, I have never physically traveled to a tribal reservation to witness firsthand a tribe’s 
material conditions as a legacy of these forms of violence and American case law defining tribal 
sovereignty and territorial boundaries. Each of these has an effect on my ability to interpret texts 
by indigenous authors which forefront the importance of this history or cultural ties, which can 
result in me misunderstanding or undervaluing particular passages.  
 Nonetheless, given the importance of this subject for understanding the modern political 
position of tribal nations, throughout the study I strive to interpret texts keeping these facts in 
mind and accounting for them as I produce categories and theories from the textual data.  
 
3.2. Text Selection Process 
 I restricted my analysis to a non-random sample of select texts by Indian political 
theorists and Supreme Court opinions. This was done to both limit the scope of the project while 
simultaneously allowing for comparison between two sets of texts that had the express purpose 
of defining Indian tribal sovereignty from different political and cultural backgrounds. The texts 
were derived from the literature review that indicated they had the express purpose of defining 
tribal sovereignty. This is consistent with grounded theory because while it focuses on limiting 
the researcher’s influence on data collection, it can and does employ guided research to both 
avoid the possibility that this study overlapped with work that has already been conducted, as 
well as ensure a reasonable foundation for assuming that trends and connections across texts 
considered can be drawn. This is meant to “achieve a practical middle ground between a theory-
laden view of the world and an unfettered empiricism” (Suddaby 2006, 635). 
 In addition to relying on the literature to point me towards indigenous texts that define 
tribal sovereignty, I employed the following criteria. 
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1. The primary authors of essays representing views on Native American conceptions of 
sovereignty had to be of Native American descent determined by tribal affiliation. 
2. Native authors were selected to include a non-random diversity of tribal nations 
across the United States. Diversity was understood as referring to both the tribal 
affiliation of primary authors as well as the geographical location of those tribal 
nations within the United States. Thus, I selected texts from authors with differing 
tribal affiliation and made locations included the Northeast, Northwest, and 
Southwest of the United States. 
3. Native authors representing tribal nations outside the continental United States (such 
as Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand, and Australia) were excluded from the sample. This 
exclusion is based on greatly different backgrounds and issues faced by those groups 
that would be difficult to account for or emphasize when drawing connections across 
Native texts. 
Given these guidelines, I selected the following texts listed in Table 1 for analysis as 
representative of indigenous political thought on “sovereignty.” All texts can be found in two 
collections of essays on Native American sovereignty, further supporting that these are texts 
representative of a range of views. Texts are listed in alphabetical order. 
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Table 1. Native American Sources 
Author(s) Background/Tribal 
Affiliation 
Text 
Barker, Joanne Lenope (Oklahoma) “For Whom Sovereignty Matters” 
Coffey, Wallace 
Tsosie, Rebecca 
Comanche (Oklahoma) 
Yaqui (Arizona) 
“Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty 
Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the 
Collective Future of Indian Nations” 
Deloria Jr., Vine 
 
Lytle, Clifford 
Standing Rock Sioux (South 
Dakota) 
“The Future of Indian Nations” 
Kickingbird, Kirke 
Kickingbird, Lynn 
Chibitty, Charles 
Berkey, Curtis 
Kiowa (Oklahoma) 
 
Comanche (Oklahoma) 
 
“Indian Sovereignty” 
Porter, Robert Seneca Nation, Heron Clan 
(New York) 
“The Meaning of Indigenous Nation 
Sovereignty” 
Tonasket, Mel 
Stevens, Ernest 
Whitehorn, Katherine 
National Congress of 
American Indians 
“American Indian Declaration of 
Sovereignty” 
 
 To represent the United States interpretations of tribal sovereignty, I selected five 
Supreme Court decisions that sought to define tribal sovereignty. I restricted my analysis to 
Supreme Court decisions because they provide the clearest legal guidance and interpretation of 
the effects and legal significance of formal legislation, even though legislation also has a direct 
impact on tribal nations. They were also included because Supreme Court opinions establish 
significant legal precedent that affects all other legislation and future court decisions. When 
analyzing these Supreme Court cases, I analyzed the opinions and not just the decisions, 
including concurring and dissenting opinions by other justices.  
 The first three decisions included compose the “Marshall Trilogy” discussed in the 
literature review as the foundational Supreme Court decisions for modern Indian law. Two more 
decisions, Oliphant v. The Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) and United States v. Wheeler (1978), 
were included as more modern cases that sought to define the scope of Indian sovereignty. 
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Including later cases was important to allow for more accurate comparison of interpretations 
found within Native texts that were written far later than the Marshall Trilogy cases. 
  Given these justifications, Table 2 includes the selected Supreme Court cases and their 
opinions, listed in chronological order. 
 
Table 2. Supreme Court Decisions and Opinions 
Texts Justices/Opinions 
Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823) Chief Justice Marshall 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) Chief Justice Marshall 
Justice Thompson 
Justice Johnson 
Justice Baldwin 
Worcester v. Georgia (1832) Chief Justice Marshall 
Justice McLean 
Oliphant v. The Suquamish Indian Tribe 
(1978) 
Justice Rehnquist 
Justice Marshall 
United States v. Wheeler (1978) Justice Stewart 
 
 
3.3. Coding Process 
 My coding process began with an initial coding of each text that was in a digital format 
converted to be readable in Microsoft Word. I then found every instance of the term “sovereign” 
or “sovereignty” within the texts. Of those instances, I examined each usage of “sovereign” and 
its surrounding context to determine if an instance had an intent to define the term “sovereign” or 
“sovereignty” or if it was used in a manner that did not define the term. Passages that did not 
define “sovereign” included more than just title pages or citations; these passages also included 
passing references, such as to “European sovereigns,” that did not explicitly define what made a 
group or power sovereign. Passages that defined “sovereign” or “sovereignty” instead either 
explicitly defined sovereignty as possessing a particular aspect or power, or which defined the 
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exercise of a particular power as deriving from a group’s sovereignty. Examples of sovereignty 
defined by examples of exercising a power included such as the following: 
[The Cherokee] contended that they enjoyed a special relationship to the U.S. federal 
government because they were a sovereign nation, proven by the fact that since 1785 they 
had entered into twelve treaties with the government that would constitute the United 
States. (Barker 2005, 12) 
 
 Passages that had intent to define were analyzed to determine how they defined 
sovereignty, and what particular powers or aspects of sovereignty those definitions included. 
Each aspect or part of a definition that emerged was used to establish initial coding categories. 
For example, if sovereignty was defined by an author as including eleven different powers, 
including the power to “wage war,” then “wage war” became a separate coding category as a 
definition of what makes a group sovereign. Similarly, if a passage differentiated between 
“cultural sovereignty” and “political sovereignty,” each received its own coding category. 
Passages that included multiple definitions were listed under each coding category that it applied 
to, which means that the numerical totals for instances of the term “sovereignty” is not 
equivalent to the totals of each category of instances but instead account for multi-faceted 
definitions.  
As I conducted this coding process, categories and connections between terms arose. For 
example, some passages connected sovereignty to language, ceremony, or oral tradition, while 
also stating that each of these are part of larger traditional cultural ties that unify an indigenous 
group as a people. I thus connected these passages together under the coding category of 
“tradition” because the all aimed at connecting sovereignty to specific cultural practices, as 
opposed to simply defining sovereignty as “cultural” which was its own coding category. As 
these categories emerged simultaneously during data collection, I then also coded for passages 
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that defined each of those aspects that may have not been picked up in the initial coding process. 
My personal interpretation of passages was thus necessary to draw connections between texts, 
but those connections were derived from the findings within the texts, and not my pre-conceived 
notions of how “sovereignty” is defined.  
These passages and individual instances were ultimately not divided by each time the 
word “sovereign” occurred. An “instance” is instead defined as a sentence or collection of 
sentences in immediate proximity to each other that expressed the same definition of 
sovereignty. This was needed to prevent a single paragraph illustrating one idea from counting as 
four separate instances, or for a single sentence that included the word “sovereign” or 
“sovereignty” multiple times from also counting as unique instances. If within a paragraph a new 
sentence defined sovereignty differently, that was considered a unique instance of sovereignty 
and was divided accordingly.  
 
3.4. Research Limitations 
While grounded theory, and qualitative inquiry more generally, is useful for observing 
and analyzing the complexities of meanings within texts that cannot be captured by quantitative 
measures, there are important limitations to this method in terms of its reliability and validity that 
must be considered. 
 
3.4.1. Reliability Concerns 
 Grounded theory’s emphasis on the position of the researcher poses some challenges for 
the reliability of this study. Every researcher has a different social and historical position that can 
affect interpretation and analysis, making it difficult to claim that this study is reliable in its 
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ability to be reproduced by another researcher employing the same method. In addition, post-
positivism forgoes the assumption reality can be perfectly measured or represented in a neural 
manner, which also poses issues for standard understands of reliability (Denzin and Lincoln 
2005, 19). 
 To account for this, social scientists have suggested different ways of evaluating the 
quality of a grounded theory study that embrace both the limits and insights of post-positivist 
emphasis on subjectivity in research. Charmaz argues that transparency of research methods and 
the researcher’s position in grounded theory can actually serve to build confidence in the 
credibility of grounded theory research. First, given that grounded theory aims to develop 
theories that correspond with observed data, greater acknowledgement of a researcher’s biases 
can assure critics that the empirical research conducted has a real basis that corresponds to what 
was observed (2005, 509-11). The findings of such a grounded research study become 
contestable on its own terms insofar as a study’s observations can be examined through the 
methods provided to see if bias is actually minimized and accounted for in analysis of the data 
(Elliot and Lazenbat 2005, 51-52). This helps avoid the concern that any observations can be 
represented as quality research by invoking grounded theory without seeking standards of 
falsifiability of research based on assumptions of universal neutrality of observation that are seen 
as impossible and undesirable from a post-positivist perspective (Charmaz 2005, 509-511).  
 Grounded theory as a process also minimizes potential bias of a research through the 
abductive process of simultaneous coding and analysis. Simultaneous coding and analysis of 
coding categories to find patterns and new directions for further coding minimizes bias by 
ensuring the researcher’s coding is directed by empirical observation, instead of producing 
abstract categories after neutrally coding all terms in isolation that may not accurately represent 
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trends within texts. This improves reliability by directing the analysis in accordance with what is 
found in the data, as opposed to connecting data points after the fact in accordance with the 
biases and background information and theories the researcher inevitably has developed on their 
own (Elliot and Lazenbat 2005, 50-52). As such, this study engages in abductive coding and 
analysis to produce coding categories and determine trends across texts, such as coding for new 
terms based on the findings of other texts.   
This study’s usage of non-random sampling may also affect the reliability of this study 
because only Supreme Court opinions are analyzed as representations of definitions of 
sovereignty by the United States. Supreme Court opinions, by their nature as legal documents, 
may not address some definitions of sovereignty because it is outside of their purview or 
legalistic focus. Each Supreme Court opinion focuses on a particular case and legal question 
without requiring the Supreme Court to define tribal sovereignty holistically. This may result in 
certain definitions of sovereignty being underrepresented or omitted by Supreme Court opinions 
in terms of their frequency without necessarily indicating that such definitions are unimportant or 
not considered by the United States legal tradition. As frequencies of definitions of sovereignty 
are analyzed as a means of deriving trends across texts, this can have a direct effect on the 
conclusions drawn by this study. 
While the legal nature of Supreme Court opinions could potentially have an impact on the 
observed empirical differences in definitions of sovereignty, these Supreme Court opinions are 
still an important representation of the United States federal government’s orientations around 
sovereignty. Supreme Court opinions require thorough explanation and defenses of why 
particular legal actions are taken, such as divesting Native peoples of the right to try non-
Natives, because the commentary provided by justices in their decisions serves as binding legal 
 42 
precedent for future legal actions. Federal laws, agency guidelines, or executive orders do not 
necessarily require legal precedent or interpretations before laying out their implementation 
guidelines. This makes Supreme Court opinions uniquely suited for the use of grounded theory 
to examine individual passages because they are written to provide definitions of legal principles, 
including tribal sovereignty, which can be coded for clear and distinct definitions. 
 
3.4.2 Validity Concerns 
 Grounded theory implicates both the internal and external validity of this study. Internal 
validity concerns do not arise from any attempt to draw causal connections, as this study is not 
necessarily concerned with how an independent variable can be deemed to cause a dependent 
variable. Instead, they arise from the ability to say that the data collected has a necessary and 
accurate connection to the coding categories and ultimately the findings of this analysis. To 
account for this, I have tried to be both self-reflexive and transparent in the coding process, 
including providing example passages throughout the Results and Discussion chapters of how 
and from where I drew my conclusions. 
Second, external validity is implicated because grounded theory and qualitative content 
analysis by their very design do not lend themselves to generalizability. My sample size was both 
relatively small and non-random which limits the potential of this study to be generalized to 
larger groups of people or trends. The attempt to make broad generalizations from the 
observations and knowledge produced by and from particular Native people risks falsely 
essentializing Native identity, culture, and political views as homogenous. This ignores that the 
needs, cultures, worldviews, and relationships with the United States federal government vary 
drastically from tribal nation to tribal nation; “native communities are not homogenous, do not 
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agree on the same issues, and do not live in splendid isolation from the world” (Smith 2005, 
115). Given an ongoing legacy of non-native researchers that intend to act as “translators” or 
“interlocutors” for Native peoples, research that is not self-reflexive about the role and desires of 
researchers such as myself who personally gain from academic work risks recreating a kind of 
political ventriloquism that misrepresents and fails to serve the interests of Native peoples 
(Marker 2010, 362-367). 
To address this, I am transparent about my text selection process that controls for tribal 
and geographical diversity amongst texts. Texts were represented as I was writing the literature 
review according to which texts were cited as significant in the debate and historical legacy of 
tribal sovereignty that builds confidence that trends observed in the data are significant enough to 
produce a theory worth exporting to further research. In addition, the purpose of this study is not 
to produce theories I assume are universally or even generally true for Native peoples. As 
Urquart et al. note, the purpose of grounded theory is “theory building, not theory verification.” 
Categories that are abstracted from data are used to generate potential explanations or theories 
that can account for empirical observations, but this process of theory generation is not meant to 
falsify other theories (2010, 360). Instead, grounded theory focuses on the relations between 
actors to expose the trends and relations between those actors and generate theories that account 
for those relations that can serve as a guide for further research and engagement (Suddaby 2006, 
635).  
A third external validity concern is found in the sampling process given that Native texts 
were selected because they explicitly present themselves as commentary or regarding Native 
American political philosophy and theories of sovereignty. This means analysis was restricted to 
source material that conforms to particular standards of the United States legal tradition and the 
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larger Western academy, as opposed to other sources such as Indigenous myths and storytelling, 
narratives, poetry and literature, art, and so forth. This decision was made not because alternative 
forms of discourse are not important, but because they present serious complications and 
limitations on drawing comparisons with Supreme Court opinions as well as Native political 
texts. The cost of the making comparison easier, however, is that my research is potentially 
aimed towards works that have already been “whitestreamed.” Grande explains that: 
…at the same time that American Indian scholars are held to the “publish or perish” rule 
of the academy they are held captive to market imperatives that demand easily digestible, 
readily accessible texts, prepackaged for whitestream consumption… In other words, the 
game is rigged. The space for American Indian intellectualism is conscripted by 
academic colonialism and the essentialist fascination with “authentic subjectivities… In 
response to this dilemma, many American Indian scholars have resorted to occupying a 
sort of intellectual middle ground, a space where relatively safe and easy questions can be 
asked of controversial subjects, often cleverly disguising critique behind the literary mask 
of fiction and poetry. (2004, 103) 
 
Grounded theory by its nature takes the concern of “whitestreaming” and academic bias 
into account. First, grounded theory can and should be conducted with an explicit commitment to 
social justice. Charmaz argues that focus on social justice, understood as “furthering equitable 
distribution of resources, fairness, and eradication of oppression” (2005, 507), can minimize the 
damaging effects and validity concerns of grounded theory by both tempering research and 
providing heightened sensitivity to the researcher for how their work might be used in the future 
(2005, 512-513). In the context of Native peoples, this study does not assume that primarily 
academic sources by Native peoples are representative of indigenous views holistically. Instead, 
academic sources are engaged because they provide the most explicit definitions of sovereignty, 
and all trends found by this study are only meant to serve as basis for other kinds of research or 
engagements with knowledge of Native peoples.  
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In addition, this study explicitly connects my location as a colonial researcher of 
European descent within the academy and the historical conditions that made my position 
possible to the actual study of data. Connecting the historical conditions of a study to its analysis 
can help avoid drawing hasty generalizations from the data that fail to take into account what 
might lead particular authors to make the claims they do, such as appealing to particular formats 
or organization of information as opposed to storytelling (Charmaz 2005, 512). In this study, I 
acknowledge that there are certainly alternate means of discussing the meaning of sovereignty 
outside of explicit definitions of sovereignty in texts by Native academics and political leaders, 
such as the fiction or poetry that Grande describes. However, alternative mediums are outside the 
scope of this project. My interest is in providing theories to account for trends found in the data 
of Supreme Court definitions of sovereignty and Native academics responding to the American 
legal tradition, and nothing more.  
 
3.4.3. The Importance of Speaking for Others 
Each of these measures helps address the concerns that arise with academic focus on 
marginalized populations such as Native peoples by researchers external to those communities. 
While these concerns cannot be wholly eliminated, there is good reason to believe that such 
academic focus is worth the associated risks. Alcoff notes that the “retreat” from research and 
activism on behalf of others can be equally problematic for marginalized populations. While it is 
necessary to recognize that our individual experiences limits our ability to come to know the 
“truth” of those in different positions, giving up on all academic or political representation of 
others can produce complacency: 
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… the "retreat" response … is simply to retreat from all practices of speaking for and 
assert that one can only know one's own narrow individual experience and one's "own 
truth" and can never make claims beyond this. This response is motivated in part by the 
desire to recognize difference, for example, different priorities, without organizing these 
differences into hierarchies… We certainly want to encourage a more receptive listening 
on the part of the discursively privileged and discourage presumptuous and oppressive 
practices of speaking for. But a retreat from speaking for will not result in an increase in 
receptive listening in all cases; it may result merely in a retreat into a narcissistic yuppie 
lifestyle in which a privileged person takes no responsibility for her society whatsoever. 
She may even feel justified in exploiting her privileged capacity for personal happiness at 
the expense of others on the grounds that she has no alternative. (1991, 17, emphasis my 
own) 
 
 This dynamic is especially true in the context of tribal sovereignty. The debate over the 
meaning of tribal sovereignty and the legal status of tribal nations is dominated by Western 
academics, legal scholars, and researchers who assume their understanding of the Western legal 
tradition and the “superior sovereignty” of the United States is neutral and objective, instead of 
structured by their subjective position relative to Native peoples (Rifkin 2009, 107). This study 
illustrates the importance of considering indigenous views on sovereignty which potentially 
implicate the legal tradition established by the Supreme Court. It is not that this study provides a 
unique vehicle for Indigenous scholarship into the academy, as the very existence of literature 
points to an ongoing debate within the academy. Instead, this study might serve as a potential 
example of engagement with cultural difference that allows for other encounters with indigenous 
research and populations on their own terms, in whatever limited way this is possible. While I 
cannot alter the history of consumption of Native scholarship within academia and the social 
sciences, I can only strive towards gestures of a “hospitable academy” which is open to both 
“Indigenous and Western epistemes” (Kuokkanen 2003, 269-270). 
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4. Results 
The first part of this analysis coded for every instance of the terms “sovereign” or 
“sovereignty” in the texts. Those references to “sovereign” were then categorized based on 
whether or not they provided an intent to define “sovereign” or “sovereignty,” or if references 
only used the term in passing. Table 3 illustrates the results. 
 
Table 3. Total References of Sovereign(ty) 
 Total 
Instances 
Total Instances 
with Intent to 
Define 
Total Indigenous 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Total Supreme Court 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Sovereign 471 110 75 (6) 33 (10) 
 
 The references that sought to define “sovereign” and “sovereignty” varied widely and 
were frequently multi-faceted. However, the individual facets and components of sovereignty 
that emerged could be grouped into four primary categories: 
a. Political (Internal) – This category of terms includes governmental and political 
operations of indigenous tribes amongst their own populations and people without 
interaction with external agents. Examples include “self-governance,” “regulating 
domestic relations,” and “economics.” 
 
b. Political (External) – This category of terms includes governmental and political 
operations of indigenous tribes that involve interactions with external agents, namely 
foreign powers, other tribes, or the United States. Examples include “treaty power,” 
“recognition,” “non-intervention,” and “waging war.” 
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c. Cultural – This category includes aspects of sovereignty directly tied to indigenous 
culture. Examples include “tradition,” “spiritual,” “history,” and “language.” 
 
d. Other – This category includes other definitions or aspects of sovereignty that do not 
neatly fit into other groupings nor have great similarity to each other, but were 
nonetheless emphasized as definitions of sovereignty, or Native sovereignty in particular. 
This includes, for example, questions regarding understanding sovereignty as “collective” 
or Native sovereignty as “dependent” or “limited.”  
 
Each term is described below, organized by frequency within each category. 
 
4.1. Political (Internal) 
 The first coding category under Political (Internal) included all entries that defined 
sovereignty as “political,” such as the explicit definition of “political sovereignty.” For example, 
some indigenous authors such as Coffey and Tsosie explicitly refer to “political sovereignty” in 
contradistinction to “cultural sovereignty” (2001, 191). These entries were classified as 
“internal” because these passages were near passages defining the powers of a sovereign over the 
people considered a part of the sovereign power.  
 Internal political functions and aspects of sovereignty were further divided based on 
specific functions and aspects of sovereignty. Table 4 illustrates these occurrences. 
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Table 4. Political (Internal) References 
 Total 
Instances 
Total Instances 
with Intent to 
Define 
Total Indigenous 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Total Supreme Court 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Political 65 21 21 (5) 0 (1) 
Government 60 22 15 (5) 7 (7) 
Administer 
and Enforce 
Laws 
32 18 6 (3) 12 (7) 
Inherent 31 12 10 (3) 2 (3) 
Economics 20 8 7 (4) 1 (1) 
Jurisdiction 15 10 2 (3) 8 (6) 
Regulate 
Property Use 
9 3 2 (2) 1 (1) 
Regulate 
Domestic 
Relations 
5 1 1 (1) 0 (1) 
 
4.1.1. Political 
 Passages coded as “political” do not include all instances of sovereignty defined in terms 
of specific political functions such as having a government, administering and enforcing laws, or 
economic functions such as taxation. Instead, passages coded as “political” were passages that 
defined sovereignty as political, or defined the expression “political sovereignty.” These 
passages fall under the larger category of Political (Internal) because these passages defined 
“political sovereignty” in terms of the governmental powers that a tribal nation has over its 
population, and did not explicitly emphasize or mention other governmental powers that fall 
under the category of Political (External). 
  
4.1.2. Government 
 “Government” as a category includes all references to sovereignty that define it in terms 
of requiring some formal political organization of peoples under the label of “government” as 
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well as the ability of a sovereign to define the form this organization takes (Kickingbird et al. 
2005, 4-5). For example, a sovereign power does not need to be a democracy, have a federal 
system, or any other specific form of government, but these entries refer to sovereignty as 
requiring some central power that produces and enforces laws and acts as the reference for 
international negotiations. 
 “Government” was the most common association and defining aspect of sovereignty 
across both indigenous texts as well as the Supreme Court opinions analyzed.  It appeared across 
every indigenous text and most of the Supreme Court opinions, excluding three.  
 
4.1.3. Administer and Enforce Laws 
 “Administer and Enforce Laws” as a coding category included all references to 
lawmaking, the enforcement of laws including punishment, and specific law-making powers 
such as education, health care, and child welfare, but excluded entries regarding citizenship, 
marriage, adoption, and economics. Thus, it included all generic references, such as associating 
sovereignty with the exclusive right to administer and enforce laws on a people, as well as 
passing references to kinds of laws that could be passed that did not feat into categories of 
economics or “regulating domestic relations.” The focus on laws was the second most prevalent 
association with sovereignty overall as well as in the Supreme Court cases.  
 
4.1.4. Inherent 
 References to sovereignty as “inherent,” or aspects of sovereignty as “inherent” referred 
to the powers of sovereignty stemming from the mere political organization of a people under a 
sovereign power without reference to any external force. It is thus the opposite of 
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conceptualizing sovereignty as relying on recognition of other sovereign powers. As Coffey and 
Tsosie explain, “Inherent sovereignty is not dependent upon any grant, gift or acknowledgment 
by the federal government. It preexists the arrival of the European people and the formation of 
the United States” (2001, 195). This coding category also includes entries that define sovereignty 
as “self-defined” or “internally defined” by a population insofar as it is made distinct from 
understandings of sovereignty that rely on external recognition.  
 Many of the indigenous texts expressly sought to define sovereignty as conditional and 
without a distinct form, but which was defined by the people themselves. Thus, even if authors 
do not define sovereignty as necessarily including specific powers such as taxation, the ability to 
wage war, or to regulate marriage, Porter, Barker, and the American Indian Declaration of 
Sovereignty all stressed that whatever “sovereignty” might be was certainly internally defined, 
and thus sovereign power is inherent to a group regardless of external recognition, even if that 
recognition also plays a part in sovereignty. 
 One unique synonym term that was coded under belief was introduced by Robert Porter 
who described sovereignty as requiring “belief.” The “belief” he describes is: 
…the belief that an Indigenous people have in their own sovereignty. It may be an 
absolute belief, such as in "we maintain the right to do whatever we want to in our own 
territory without limitation," or it may be a more limited version, such as "we maintain 
the right to do whatever we want to in our territory so long as our neighbors do not 
object." (2002, 102) 
 
These passages were also coded under the “inherent” category because Porter explicitly contrasts 
this belief as a basis of sovereignty from external recognition, and because the extent of political 
functions is based on what belief those nations can do within their own territory. For example, 
Porter later notes that “the problem with giving so much emphasis to the recognition factor is 
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that it unnecessarily casts aside belief and ability as key determinants of being a sovereign” 
(2002, 105). 
 It is also worth noting that what makes sovereignty “inherent” to a population may be 
understood to include more than merely a “mandate of the people,” but instead can include 
cultural aspects such as being connected by cultural ties or spiritual origins. For example, Oren 
Lyons, an Iroquois leader, links inherent sovereignty to the fact that “all beings are created 
equal” and “embody the Creator” (Coffey and Tsosie 2001, 200). However, because the ultimate 
effect of this inherent political sovereignty is to determine governmental form, these entries were 
coded as Political (Internal) and entries relating to the ability of a sovereign power to determine 
cultural practices were coded as “Self-Determination.” 
 
4.1.5. Economics (Internal) 
 References coded as related to “economics” included those that define sovereignty as 
control of one’s economic resources, establishing a monetary system, taxation, allocation of 
money such as governmental spending, and regulation of trade within and across the borders of a 
sovereign power, such as the power to establish tariffs or regulate imports and exports. 
It is important to note that the “regulation of property” does not imply other economic 
concepts such as “private property” or particular sovereign powers such as eminent domain 
(Kickingbird et al. 2005, 23). Those powers are defined separately, and fall under the power of a 
sovereign to regulate property use. 
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4.1.6. Jurisdiction 
 “Jurisdiction” includes all references to the scope of sovereign power, or the extent to 
which a sovereign power has “authority” to act. The scope of jurisdiction was frequently further 
defined and associated with particular territory or populations, such as Indian nations “sovereign 
authority over their members and territories” (Porter 2002, 84).  
 
4.1.7. Regulate Property Use 
 “Regulate property use” includes all references to a sovereign power’s ability to control 
the territory over which it has jurisdiction, including resource management and extraction, 
setting aside land for specific purposes such as hunting or conservation, eminent domain,  and 
others. 
 
4.1.8. Regulate Domestic Relations 
 “Regulate Domestic Relations” included all references that both used this exact 
expression as well as references to the sovereign’s power to regulate membership or citizenship, 
marriage, and adoption. While “membership” to a sovereign nation was defined in the Supreme 
Court cases as premised on “citizenship,” that is not necessarily the framework employed by 
indigenous authors to describe “membership.” Instead, membership can be determined by Native 
customs and understood as belonging to an indigenous community in ways that are not captured 
by the relationship between a citizen and a state (Kickingbird et al. 2005, 10).  
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4.2. Political (External) 
 Political (External) includes all powers involving the sovereign powers government 
interacting with external agents or powers. Table 5 illustrates the number of occurrences of these 
references.  
 
Table 5. Political (External) References 
 Total 
Instances 
Total Instances 
with Intent to 
Define 
Total Indigenous 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Total Supreme Court 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Recognition 60 14 8 (4) 6 (5) 
Treaties 55 12 6 (5) 6 (9) 
Territory 51 19 8 (3) 11 (9) 
Nation (State) 27 6 6 (3) 0 (3) 
Non-
Intervention 
12 3 1 (2) 2 (4) 
Wage War 8 3 1 (2) 2 (4) 
 
 
4.2.1. Recognition 
The most frequently associated aspect of sovereignty that is both politically and 
externally determined is the notion of “recognition;” namely, is a power recognized as having a 
“separate autonomy political existence” other powers (Coffey and Tsosie 2001, 198)? This 
recognition sometimes takes the form of being considered a “nation” by other sovereign powers, 
but need not be in the specific Western terms of “nationhood.” This recognition is frequently is 
established by formal agreements that can are defined as only being able to be taken by two or 
more sovereign nations, such as treaties or land sales. Defining indigenous sovereignty in terms 
of “recognition” as includes passages that refer to “federally recognized tribes” status by the 
United States. 
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Kickingbird et al. note that the refusal to recognize another nation as sovereign does not 
necessarily negate their sovereignty. However, “the recognition of a nation’s sovereignty by 
other nations can strength the claim to sovereignty” made by a power (2005, 3-4). Regulating use 
of property does include, however, control over resources on tribal territory, such as water, fossil 
fuels, and other resources that require mining such as uranium or gold. 
 
4.2.2. Treaties 
Sovereignty is frequently defined and associated by indigenous authors based on the 
ability to enter into treaties, as exemplified by over 800 treaties signed between various 
American Indian nations and the United States (Kickingbird et al. 2005, 6). While arguably a 
subset of “recognition,” passages defining sovereignty in terms of the ability to enter into treaties 
were coded separately as treaty powers contain a range of actions that a sovereign power can 
take, such as forming alliances (Kickingbird et al. 2005, 5), as well as forms of cultural and 
political recognition that is distinct from “recognition” in a purely political sense. Coffey and 
Tsosie provides examples such as the Comanche/Southern Ute Treaty and the Navajo/San Juan 
Southern Paiute treaty which explicitly rely on appeals to culture, tradition, and recognition of 
historical claims legitimized by oral tradition (2001, 199).  
 
4.2.3. Territory 
Across all of the texts, sovereignty was defined as having some major relationship to the 
land/territory of a power. While defining sovereignty in terms of territory has some conceptual 
ties to coding categories that fall under Political (Internal) such as jurisdiction, this study 
considers territory an aspect of Political (External) sovereignty because it relies on acceptance 
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other nations and because control over territory is the primary source of political contestation 
between sovereign powers mentioned by the authors sampled.  
The connection of a sovereign power to land need not necessarily be considered one of 
“ownership,” as not all tribal nations or authors sampled understand the relationship as being of 
indigenous groups having “ownership” of the land because of particular traditional or spiritual 
conceptions of land. However, that language is frequently used in legal disputes and appeals to 
treaty obligations.  
 
4.2.4. Nation (State) 
 “Nation (State)” includes all references that define sovereignty as belonging to or being 
embodied in a “nation” or “state.” “Nationhood” is a particular political organization that implies 
a large-scale organization as well as participation in the international arena of “nations.” Thus, to 
be sovereign is to be a “nation” which is why justices such as McLean in Worcester v. Georgia 
believe that Native American tribal groups are not “sovereign.”  
 
4.2.5. Nonintervention 
Powers were defined in multiple texts as “sovereign” if they are understood to have a 
“right” to not have their domestic affairs or the administering of self-governance interfered with 
by other powers (Barker 2005, 3). While this notion of non-intervention was also associated with 
Western definitions of sovereignty and nationhood, some authors noted that the principle of non-
intervention is held by many indigenous powers as an appeal against the external forces of 
colonization (Barker 2005, 18). 
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4.2.6. Wage War 
 “Sovereignty” was at times defined as the right to wage war or maintain a military. This 
is because it involves recognition by other sovereign powers as engaging in “war” defined in 
terms of nations that would fall under international regimes such as the Law of Armed Conflict. 
Any other violence between powers not defined as “sovereign” is thus not considered “war.” 
 
4.3. Cultural 
 Some indigenous authors explicitly defined “cultural sovereignty” as a separate 
conception of sovereignty, or at least defined sovereignty as necessarily containing a cultural 
component such as how to determine membership or what laws a sovereign power would 
administer and exist under. Those entries that referred to “culture” as an aspect of sovereignty or 
used the term “cultural sovereignty” were thus coded as “culture,” and further divisions were 
made for specific aspects of cultural sovereignty.  
Table 6 illustrates these references and their occurrences. 
 
Table 6. Cultural References 
 Total 
Instances 
Total Instances 
with Intent to 
Define 
Total Indigenous 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Total Supreme Court 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Culture 50 22 21 (5) 1 (1) 
Self-
Determination 
27 8 8 (5) 0 (0) 
Tradition 18 9 9 (3) 0 (0) 
History 4 3 3 (1) 0 (0) 
Spiritual 4 3 3 (2) 0 (0) 
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4.3.1. Self-Determination 
As Deloria and Lytle note, “self-determination and self-government are not equivalent 
terms” (307). However, self-determination throughout the texts was frequently used without an 
intent to define the meaning of the term, even if sovereignty was defined as a right to self-
determine. Barker comes closest by referring to self-determination as: 
… a legal category that came to be deﬁned by both group and individual rights not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or 
physical or mental ability, and to determine one’s own governments, laws, economies, 
identities, and cultures. (19) 
 
Thus, sovereignty defined in terms of “self-determination” is explicitly cultural in that it refers to 
the ability of a sovereign to determine whether the government and people adopt or are able to 
practice particular cultural practices and various other functions related to identity, tradition, or 
cultural expression. This is consistent with references throughout indigenous texts to the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights specific granting of the right of indigenous people to “self-
determine” in terms of “tradition, custom, property, language, oral histories, philosophies, 
writing systems, educational systems, medicines, health practices, resources, lands, and self- 
deﬁnition” (quoted in Barker 20). 
 
4.3.2. Tradition 
Sovereignty was defined across multiple indigenous texts as being founded on or tied to 
indigenous people’s tradition, including oral history, language, ceremonies, and others cultural 
expressions. Barker notes that many indigenous activists point to the unique shared culture of 
indigenous groups as the basis of their sovereignty. To be sovereign is to have cultural autonomy 
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as a group to determine how a group will practice, exercise, and maintain one’s traditions 
(Barker 2-3; 18).  
 Spiritual conceptions of sovereignty were coded separately because they provided an 
alternate account to how sovereignty is founded, for example as being granted by the Creator, 
whereas cultural origins of sovereignty need not necessary include any conception of spirituality 
but may simply include ties by family or shared practices (Coffey and Tsosie 203). 
 
4.3.4. History 
 In addition to understanding oral history as merely an aspect of tradition that provides the 
founding basis for people coming together under a “sovereign power,” “history” can also be a 
separate aspect of “sovereignty” in that the details of that history affect how sovereignty is 
understood and exercised, especially in relation to interactions with foreign powers. Coffey and 
Tsosie note that incorporating cultural into a comprehensive definition of sovereignty would 
result in practices such as oral tradition being considered in negotiating disputes over land as 
well as interpreting terms of treaties based on how a group understands their ancestors intent in 
signing a treaty, as opposed to strict legal interpretations of terms (200-202).   
 
4.3.5. Spiritual 
 Defining sovereignty as based on “spiritual sources” (Kickingbird et al. 2) or 
“spirituality” is to understood spirituality or religion as not just being a factor that brings people 
together under a single sovereign power, but can itself be defined as the basis or origin of 
sovereign authority. For example, Coffey and Tsosie quote Dagmar Thorpe who explains how 
Native understandings of sovereignty can include recognition of the: 
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…one sovereign – the Creator. He has given us a life, and we live by the Creator's good 
will. If we are to survive we must recognize and live within His law. Our laws were 
created to keep our people within the framework of the Creator's laws. They were 
principles of behavior toward each other and all of creation. Our nations are eroding 
because we have ceased to recognize the sovereignty of the Creator and have replaced it 
with a sovereignty established by human beings. (203) 
 
4.4. Other 
Sovereignty was also defined and associated with other terms that did not fit neatly into the other 
three categories, nor had a clear grouping to establish another category. These occurrences are 
illustrated in Table 7. 
Table 7. Other References 
 Total 
Instances 
Total Instances 
with Intent to 
Define 
Total Indigenous 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Total Supreme Court 
Definitions (# of 
Unique Sources) 
Limited 46 19 9 (3) 10 (4) 
Collective 20 14 14 (3) 0 (0) 
Belief 12 8 8 (1) 0 (0) 
Problematic 7 1 1 (1) 0 (0) 
Contingent 6 3 3 (1) 0 (0) 
Self-Defined 5 2 2 (1) 0 (0) 
Western 
Origin 
6 3 3 (6) 0 (0) 
 
4.4.1. Limited 
 References coded as “limited” included all passages that define Native American 
sovereignty as “limited” or “dependent” or subject to the “overriding sovereignty” of the United 
States federal government. When found in Native American texts, these references explicitly 
cited the legal precedent established by Supreme Court cases such as Cherokee v. Georgia which 
legally defined tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” or implicitly referred to this legal 
precedent by describing modern indigenous sovereignty as being subject to the “overriding 
sovereignty” of the United States.  
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These definitions did not define “sovereignty” as an overall concept as being “limited” or 
“dependent,” but instead defined Native American sovereignty, both currently and historically, in 
terms of being “limited” by or “dependent” on the United States federal government. Similarly, 
the Supreme Court opinions only associated sovereignty with being “limited” when directly 
referring to Native American tribes as “dependent” or “limited” by the federal government.  
 
4.4.2. Collective 
 Passages coded as “collective” definitions of sovereignty include two primary concepts. 
First, defining sovereignty as pertaining only to collectives of people, and not individuals. 
Second, defined sovereignty as premised on and aiming to benefit collective benefit and not 
individual gains. 
First, passages that defined sovereignty as belonging to collectives drew a distinction 
between the ability of an individual to have control over themselves, or “personal sovereignty,” 
and “sovereignty” in terms of collective political organizations. For example, Porter notes that: 
It is also worth mentioning that the concept of sovereignty is only applicable to peoples, 
not individuals. In other words, an individual cannot be sovereign. (106) 
 
Porter later states: 
To the extent that anyone might adhere to a notion of "personal sovereignty," they are 
really adhering to selfishness, not some attribute associated with being and maintaining 
an existence as a distinct people. (107) 
 
Second, sovereignty is also defined as “collective” in contrast to other understandings of 
sovereignty that focus on the importance of the individual in a society under a sovereign power. 
Under a collective understanding of sovereignty, those that are part of a sovereign power are not 
understood as merely individuals with self-interested reasons to acknowledge sovereign power, 
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but are instead fundamentally connected such that the primary purpose of sovereignty is the 
collective interest of a group, as opposed to individual success. For example, as Coffey and 
Tsosie note: 
The group-based structure  of  tribal  societies  leads  to a conception of   sovereignty that 
is "oriented primarily toward the existence and continuance of the group." For Indian 
nations, then, unlike other "oppressed groups" in society, sovereignty seems to require 
"constructive group action rather than demands for self-determination. (197) 
 
4.4.3. Problematic 
 In addition to authors discussing the importance of sovereignty as a paradigm for Native 
Americans to conceptualize their means collective organization or governance, some authors also 
identified the very conception of sovereignty as problematic or harmful as a term or paradigm for 
indigenous epistemologies, much in the same vein of authors such as Rifkin and Alfred as 
mentioned in the literature review. As Barker notes: 
… translating indigenous epistemologies about law, governance, and culture through the 
discursive rubric of sovereignty was and is problematic.64 Sovereignty as a discourse is 
unable to capture fully the indigenous meanings, perspectives, and identities about law, 
governance, and culture, and thus over time it impacts how those epistemologies and 
perspectives are represented and understood. (2005, 19) 
 
Similarly, and more strongly worded, Barker also states that, “Sovereignty carries the horrible 
stench of colonialism. It is incomplete, inaccurate, and troubled” (2005, 26). This is often 
because sovereignty is associated with “its etymological origins within European colonial law 
and Christian ideologies” (Barker 2005, 24). Thus, passages that criticize the usage of 
“sovereignty” as a paradigm means of understanding anything about Native American peoples’ 
political and cultural organization was coded under the category of “problematic.”  
 It is worth noting that these entries do not always go so far as to say that sovereignty is an 
irredeemable concept. Instead, these entries merely stress the importance of recognizing the 
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limitations and potential problems associated with relying on sovereignty as a concept without 
recognition of its origins as well as simultaneously stressing alternative indigenous means of 
understanding political organization, law, culture, or other themes. This dynamic will be 
explored in detail in the discussion chapter. 
 
4.4.4. Contingent 
 References to sovereignty as “contingent” defined sovereignty as being inherently unable 
to be defined universally in an ahistorical manner. Thus, definitions of sovereignty are always 
contextual and particular, and at best can speak to forms or aspects of sovereignty as opposed to 
providing an essential definition of sovereignty that could be considered true when describing 
any population. As Barker writes: 
What is important to keep in mind when encountering these myriad discursive practices 
is that sovereignty is historically contingent. There is no ﬁxed meaning for what 
sovereignty is—what it means by deﬁnition, what it implies in public debate, or how it 
has been conceptualized in international, national, or indigenous law. Sovereignty—and 
its related histories, perspectives, and identities—is embedded within the speciﬁc social 
relations in which it is invoked and given meaning. (2005, 21, emphasis my own) 
 
Sovereignty is further described as contingent through Barker and Porter not just because 
the historical content or time period can alter its definition and reception, but because the 
definition or meaning of “sovereignty” is constituted by a multiple of sources with varying 
interpretations, especially when considering differences in the position of the colonizer and the 
colonized. As Porter notes: 
…a complete definition of Indigenous nation sovereignty requires an understanding of all 
three different perspectives. No single definition can suffice. Accordingly, any complete 
answer to the sovereignty question must incorporate the Indigenous "answer," the 
colonial "answer," and the international "answer." (2002, 78, emphasis my own) 
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Porter goes on to say that: 
 
The second step is to reject the notion that within the Indigenous perspective there is any 
such thing as one single, monolithic Indigenous perspective. There are, within the United 
States, over six hundred recognized and unrecognized Indigenous sovereigns. They vary 
in every conceivable manner. By virtue of population, culture, geography, and the 
nuances of history, no two Indigenous peoples are the same. It serves little purpose, other 
than to encourage mistake, to take the position that, with respect to defining Indigenous 
nation sovereignty, "one size fits all." (2002, 101, emphasis my own) 
  
Both of these passages capture the importance of recognizing that any attempt to define 
sovereignty cannot be seen as generalizable in all cases or contexts.  
 
4.4.5. Western Origin 
 As discussed in the chapter on the historical background of sovereignty, some scholars 
trace the meaning and etymology of “sovereignty” to Western legal and political origins. For 
example, Barker, quoting Deloria, Jr., ties sovereignty to European religious tradition: 
Deloria, Jr., writes that sovereignty originated as a theological term within early east 
Asian and European discourses: “sovereignty is an ancient idea, once used to describe 
both the power and arbitrary nature of the deity by peoples in the Near East. Although 
originally a theological term it was appropriated by European political thinkers in the 
centuries following the Reformation to characterize the person of the King as head of the 
state.” (2005, 1-2) 
 
However, these references are not just presentations of historical facts as mere 
background information but instead define sovereignty as a political paradigm based on how 
these historical origins and legacies affect its deployment in the present. Barker later notes that: 
Many ﬁnd it troubling that indigenous histories and cultures are often framed through 
sovereignty without a consideration of the ways in which its ideological origins might 
predispose a distortion or negation of indigenous epistemologies of law and governance. 
(2005, 20, emphasis my own) 
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While providing an account of what definitions of sovereignty are observed across texts 
and the frequency of those definitions is helpful in illuminating overall trends and prevalence of 
topics, alone they are insufficient for demonstrating the importance or implications of differences 
or findings. It is necessary to closely compare the definitions provided in order to produce 
theories and potential explanations that account for the differences observed. 
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5. Discussion 
This chapter will highlight the major findings of the results and coding categories, 
connecting these findings and particular ideas from the texts to larger discussions of how tribal 
sovereignty becomes conceptualized. These findings include the absence of focus on in Supreme 
Court opinions, greater emphasis by Supreme Court opinions on external political definitions of 
sovereignty, Native characterization of terms as “problematic,” and Native definitions of 
sovereignty as “contingent.” Each will be discussed below. 
 
5.1. Cultural Sovereignty vs. Political Sovereignty 
A major finding when analyzing trends across the texts was the difference in emphasis 
placed on culture as a definitional aspect of sovereignty. Culture in this context includes things 
such as language, heritage, traditions, ceremonies and rituals, and other unique aspects of a 
collection of people. While the Native American texts had 50 references to culture linked to 
mentions of sovereignty, with 21 of those references explicitly defining sovereignty in terms of 
culture, the Supreme Court opinions had only one reference to culture as an aspect of 
sovereignty. Justice Thompson in the dissenting opinion of Worcester v. Georgia (1823) 
concludes that, in reference to the Cherokee Indians: 
… it is not perceived how it is possible to escape the conclusion that they form a 
sovereign state… They have been admitted and treated as a people governed solely and 
exclusively by their own laws, usages, and customs within their own territory, claiming 
and exercising exclusive dominion over the same, yielding up by treaty, from time to 
time, portions of their land, but still claiming absolute sovereignty and self-government 
over what remained unsold. (53, emphasis my own) 
 
This entry does not even make a strong claim that culture is a primary aspect of sovereignty, but 
instead merely notes that the fact that the Cherokee Indians are governed by particular customs, 
and frames sovereignty as a question of “dominion” over territory.  
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Justice Thompson’s focus on territory and legal domination of land posits cultural 
tradition as an effect of sovereignty; something that can be protected by the laws of a sovereign 
nation, but which is not a foundational aspect of sovereignty. Native authors such as Barker, 
Coffey and Tsosie who were analyzed noted that the American legal tradition understands the 
purpose of sovereignty when founding a “state” or “nation” is to secure individual rights or 
benefits of peoples that form political associations without the necessity of cultural ties. The 
focus is thus on “political” purposes such as securing property rights, providing physical 
security, and so on. In this view, sovereignty is founded on a social contract whose instrumental 
purpose is to maximize an individual’s well-being because it is in the member’s self-interest, 
without any direct or necessary relationship to culture, religion, language, and so on (Coffey and 
Tsosie 2001, 197).  
In contrast, the Native American texts suggest a much more fundamental role for culture. 
For authors such as Coffey and Tsosie, the very definition and scope of sovereignty is “deeply 
rooted in our cultural identity and our traditional spiritual values” (2001, 210). The purpose of 
sovereignty is thus not to maximize a disparate set of individual rights and interests, but instead 
to maximize the collective interest of a group defined by cultural ties (Cobb 2005, 121). The 
modern legal struggles for Native jurisdiction and control of land is thus only a minor part of a 
larger battle for Indian cultural survival in the legacy of two centuries of violence (Coffey and 
Tsosie 2011, 195-196). 
 Whether or not sovereignty is defined in terms of culture has significant implications 
both in terms of providing a foundation for sovereignty located in cultural distinctness as well as 
in altering the way that political functions such as treaties are implemented. 
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5.1.1. The Importance of Cultural Distinctness 
 The authors sampled went so far as to say, as illustrated by Porter, that “cultural 
distinctness is the most powerful force for ensuring one’s belief in being sovereign as well as 
being recognized by other peoples” (2002, 111). Ties of culture are not simply tolerated by a 
sovereign power or a mere right to be protected or not under whatever government tribal nations 
choose for themselves, but instead becomes the very basis of the “people” of a sovereign 
(Fairbanks 1995, 145). This might be one way of understanding what Rifkin refers to as the 
“meta-political authority” in question by sovereignty defined as “the ability to define the content 
and scope of ‘law’ and ‘politics’” by locating the origin of that ability in collective cultural 
identification (2009, 91). This marks an important shift in analysis of tribal sovereignty away 
from the scope of sovereignty defined by legal mandate and the legacy of treaties, as decisions 
such as Cherokee v. Georgia, Worcester v. Georgia, and United States v. Wheeler each 
emphasized. 
 Focus on cultural connections as a basis for sovereignty is simultaneously tied to and yet 
distinct from questions of jurisdiction of territory. For example, Coffey and Tsosie note that 
some Indian nations have distinct sets of rights for tribal members that live on reservations and 
for those that live off-reservation, including the denial of voting rights to those who do not live 
on reservations. Such tribal decisions and disputes cannot be explained in terms of strictly 
territorial conceptions of sovereignty because the demand for a right to vote can only make sense 
by acknowledging that their ties the same sovereign authority is based on culture, and not just 
territory or residence (Coffey and Tsosie 199). This example is not raised to show that either 
cultural sovereignty is problematic compared to territorial conceptions of sovereignty, or even to 
take a stance on how such nations should orient themselves towards voting rights for their 
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members. It more important demonstrates that the scope and particularities of tribal governance 
is seen to derive from cultural norms, and not strictly political jurisdiction. 
 The focus on cultural distinctness as foundational to sovereignty raises other questions 
beyond merely what particular laws or norms can be drawn from culture. For example, a critical 
question that arises is how culturally “distinct” must a people be to be considered culturally 
“distinct” enough to motivate inherent sovereignty or be recognized as sovereign by foreign 
powers? Porter, Barker, and Coffey and Tsosie all raise this question but ultimately acknowledge 
that is not something that can ever be determined in advance, or externally (Porter 2001, 102; 
Barker 2005, 26; Coffey and Tsosie 2001, 191).  That being said, some aspects of culture are 
emphasized within the texts as important for understanding tribal nations as “distinct.” These 
emphasized aspects of culture included language, oral tradition, and spirituality.   
 For Deloria and Lytle, language is “the first glue that links peoples together” (2005, 312). 
It serves as not only a very concrete reminder of cultural ties and shared heritage, but language 
uniquely translates all other information or ideas with particular connotations. For example, 
Deloria and Lytle analyze the effects of education programs, such as American Indian boarding 
schools established by the Civilization Fund Act of 1819, on Native Americans ability to 
formulate ideas of self-government and self-determination. They note federal land allotment and 
housing policies created rural slums with Indian children whose first language became English, 
threatening not only survival of unique languages but also the preservation and communication 
of ideas not easily captured by the English language. While many tribal nations were able to 
appeal for funding for bilingual education programs which helped protect the survival of these 
languages in areas where usage had begun to decline, the effects of these policies were 
significant threats to Indian cultural survival (Deloria and Lytle 2005, 312). The result of the 
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legacy of these policies to emphasize English is the continuous decline in speakers of traditional 
languages, which results in modern Native Americans acquiring most of their information about 
tribal sovereignty and legal authority from texts written in English by non-Indians. For example, 
tribal leaders may acquire the information they use to base their legal challenges from colonial 
sources such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Supreme Court traditions which both assume 
severely limited conceptions of tribal sovereignty. The result is that they may be convinced that 
their range of legal options available is limited, and thus they may scale back demands placed on 
the federal government (Porter 2011, 89-91).  
 Oral tradition serves a similar purpose to language in that it functions as a cultural tie. 
However, its purpose might be understood not as the how of communicating traditional values, 
but the what. Oral tradition and the stories contained within them are of deep importance to 
many tribal nations in ways that are difficult to explain or comprehend within English or from a 
non-Native perspective. As Harjo and Storm explain: 
Stories are our wealth. Winter nights we tell them over and over. Once a star fell from the 
sky, but it wasn’t just any star, just as this isn’t just any ordinary place. That cedar tree 
marks the event and the land remembers the flash of its death flight. To describe anything 
in winter whether it occurs in the past or the future requires a denser language, one thick 
with the promise of new lambs, heavy with the weight of corn milk. (1989, 24) 
 
These stories serve as a means of preserving “collective knowledge and memory of the people … 
through the generations,” much in the way that European countries and the United States use 
written histories to maintain legacies of past interpretations of history, law, and cultural values 
(Porter 2002, 88). While American legal scholars may point to American case law, the Federalist 
Papers, and other written records of legal debates in order to form views of interpretation of laws 
throughout history, many tribal nations must rely on an oral legacy of those histories and past 
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organizations, such as the Ho-de-no-sau-ne (also known as the League of the Five Nations, or the 
Iroquois Confederacy).  
 Finally, spirituality can be a fundamental source of conceptualizing tribal sovereignty 
because it can set the scope and purpose of sovereignty through values of what constitutes the 
responsibility or purpose of collective organization. Coffey and Tsosie, citing other Native 
leaders and scholars such as Deloria and Lyons, describes this usage of spirituality as being the 
origin of obligation to their welfare of the population of a tribe, and to the welfare of the land and 
others more generally. Instead of the importance of welfare or protection of members of a nation 
deriving from a “social contract,” the binding force of a population might be the “spiritual 
instructions which demand respect for the other living beings which share this earth and for the 
future generations who will inherent this earth.” The very sense of political and cultural 
“community” that allows for the collectivity of sovereignty can be derived from spirituality that 
provides the “overriding values and content of governance,” in stark contrast to Western and 
secular notions of sovereignty (Coffey and Tsosie, 200). 
 These aspects of culture are directly tied to “inherent” understandings of sovereignty 
because they are employed by Native peoples to define sovereignty on their own terms. Tradition 
does not serve as a static referent that binds tribal nations to the past, but instead lends itself to a 
dynamic process of interpretation and deliberation that allows Native Americans to define how 
they wish to govern themselves (Coffey and Tsosie 199). Culture becomes one of the critical 
aspects of sovereignty as a means to challenge the limited paradigm of political sovereignty 
through a “constitutive redefinition of sovereignty that supersedes the political definition” 
(Endres 2009, 44-45). As such, Deloria and Lytle argue that focus on cultural preservation is of 
the utmost importance for tribal nations seeking sovereignty and self-determination because, as 
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the note, “Until Indians can get a more comprehensive idea of their own regarding the content of 
their cultures, resolution of conflicts with the larger society will be almost impossible” (2005, 
311). 
 
5.1.2. Culture and Treaty Interpretation 
 One final area in which incorporating culture into definitions of sovereignty is crucial for 
understanding how tribal sovereignty is incorporated and understood within the law is in treaty 
interpretation. As mentioned earlier, inclusion of oral tradition when considering the scope and 
effects of treaties today could significantly alter the way they are read to consider that the 
original ancestors of tribal nations were not signing to the conditions that the treaties were later 
interrupted to include. As Eaglewoman argues: 
“Native ancestors did not negotiate treaties and agreements to achieve the substandard 
quality of life, the criminalization and victimization of Native peoples, and the constant 
struggle for cultural survival endured by the majority of tribal citizens in the 2000s.” 
(2012, 680) 
 
 
Instead of strict interpretation of the contents of treaties and other legal agreements, 
inclusion of oral history into treaty interpretation could be part of what Coffey and Tsosie deem a 
“bilateral process” that includes both literal interpretations of English terms of the treaty as well 
as the intent of tribal Ancestors derived from oral tradition. This is not meant to supplant the 
English terms of the treaty, but to acknowledge the importance of the fact that the words of tribal 
ancestors are not mentioned at all in these critical documents, for example in the 1785 Treaty of 
Hopewell. This might alter legal doctrines founded on these treaties as the “trust doctrine” which 
is based on tribal groups ceding many aspects of political sovereignty to the United States in 
exchange for protection and management (Coffey and Tsosie 2001, 204). Cultural interpretations 
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of sovereignty are foundational to understanding external aspects of political sovereignty 
because they can set the terms of what relationships with other countries even entails (Coffey 
and Tsosie 2001, 198).  
An important finding of this study is that the idea of using oral tradition as a means of 
interpreting the extent of the treaties is briefly mentioned indirectly within the Supreme Court 
decisions that are constantly cited as a means of circumscribing modern tribal nations’ 
sovereignty. For example, in Justice McLean’s concurring opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, he 
describes the issues that arise from solely relying on the English terms of treaty obligations to 
hold Natives accountable to legal agreements when he writes: 
Is it reasonable to suppose that the Indians, who could not write and most probably could 
not read, who certainly were not critical judges of our language, should distinguish the 
word "allotted" from the words "marked out." The actual subject of contract was the 
dividing line between the two nations, and their attention may very well be supposed to 
have been confined to that subject. When, in fact, they were ceding lands to the United 
States, and describing the extent of their cession, it may very well be supposed that they 
might not understand the term employed as indicating that, instead of granting, they were 
receiving lands. … It could not, however, be supposed that any intention existed of 
restricting the full use of the lands they reserved . (552-553, emphasis my own) 
 
Justice McLean later in his decision also makes the explicit claim that how the treaty was 
understood, not only what the treaty stated, was important for interpreting treaty obligation. 
Justice McLean explicitly rejected any interpretation of the treaties meant solely to prejudice 
Native Americans, in stating that: 
The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their 
prejudice. If words be made use of which are susceptible of a more extended meaning 
than their plain import, as connected with the tenor of the treaty, they should be 
considered as used only in the latter sense. To contend that the word "allotted," in 
reference to the land guarantied to the Indians in certain treaties, indicates a favour 
conferred, rather than a right acknowledged, would, it would seem to me, do injustice to 
the understanding of the parties. How the words of the treaty were understood by this 
unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of 
construction. (582, emphasis my own) 
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Ironically, Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion in Oliphant v. The Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) 
that tribal nations did not have the right to try non-natives within their own legal system, also 
indicates that treaties cannot be interpreted neutrally by their texts, but must also consider the 
views of those who wrote them at the time: 
"Indian law" draws principally upon the treaties drawn and executed by the Executive 
Branch and legislation passed by Congress. These instruments, which, beyond their 
actual text, form the backdrop for the intricate web of judicially made Indian law, cannot 
be interpreted in isolation, but must be read in light of the common notions of the day and 
the assumptions of those who drafted them. (206, emphasis my own) 
 
Each of these passages and others point towards the importance of incorporating tribal 
history and tradition into even modern legal disputes, as they cannot be understood in isolation. 
This is significant given the importance that both indigenous texts and Supreme Court opinions 
placed on the importance of treaties for explaining the scope of indigenous as well as United 
States sovereignty.  
 
5.2. Emphasis on Internal vs External Political Sovereignty 
 Another critical finding that arose from comparing Native American conceptions of 
sovereignty with the Supreme Court opinions was the differences in emphasis on internal versus 
external determinations of sovereignty. While both understandings of political sovereignty were 
featured throughout both sets of texts, the Supreme Court decisions placed greater emphasis on 
external definitions of political sovereignty, especially the importance of treaty obligations. This 
difference in emphasis was both numerical and conceptual. First, the Supreme Court opinions 
had more references to treaties as dictating the scope of United States and Tribal sovereignty. 
Second, while definitions of sovereignty as “inherent” or “self-defined” were throughout the 
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Native texts, there is very little mention of sovereignty defined as “inherent” in the Supreme 
Court opinions.  
 While the Native American texts each placed at least some emphasis on tribal nations 
defining the terms of their sovereignty which emanates from their own organization and 
decisions without exclusively relying on foreign recognition, this was not as clear within the 
Supreme Court opinions. It is thus worth looking at detail how sovereignty is described within 
the court decisions with reference to recognition by the United States. 
 
5.2.1. Treaties as the Basis of Tribal Sovereignty 
 For example, in Johnson v. M’Intosh, the first of the Marshall Trilogy decisions, the 
United States is understood to have sovereign control of the land it controls in the United States 
by appealing to the “discovery doctrine,” the principle that gave whichever European nation was 
first to discover territory in the Americas the exclusive right to acquire territory from any native 
groups present on that land. Justice Marshall, in his dismissal of the case on the grounds that 
native groups had no standing in US courts as “foreign nations,” traces the history of various 
European powers such as Spain, France, and Great Britain acquiring land by appealing to these 
“titles of discovery” (574-575). Having a title of discovery thus allowed these nations the 
exclusive right to extinguish the “right to occupancy” that Indians were understood to possess. 
While Indians were understood to have “possessed in full sovereignty” the land originally, the 
discovery doctrine limited the actors that could be involved divesting land from Indians by either 
“purchase or by conquest” (587) by only allowing governments of European nations to acquire 
territory, allowing the United States to “annul deeds made by Indians to individuals for the 
private use of the purchasers” (585).  
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Throughout this historical tracing of the origins of sovereign control of territory, there is 
no mention to sovereignty originating from the inherent organization of people. Even when there 
are conflicting views of the scope of tribal sovereignty, these disagreements between opinions 
are consistently framed within the terms of external recognition and within treaties. This conflict 
of conclusions but reliance on external understandings of political sovereignty can be seen in the 
disagreement between Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Thompson in their opinions in 
Cherokee v. Georgia. 
Justice Marshall provided the opinion of the court that Indians are not “foreign nations.” 
Justice Marshall provides only one mention of “sovereignty” in which he states that: 
[Indians] and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as 
being so completely under the  sovereignty and dominion of the United States that any 
attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be 
considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an act of hostility. (17-18) 
 
Chief Justice Marshall also appeals to the framers of the Constitution in how the wrote the 
Commerce Clause. As written, this clause grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  This wording 
draws an explicit distinction between “foreign Nations” and “Indian Tribes.” As such, Chief 
Justice Marshall concludes that: 
These considerations go far to support the opinion that the framers of our Constitution 
had not the Indian tribes in view when they opened the courts of the union to 
controversies between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign states. (18) 
 
 Justice Thompson provided a dissenting opinion in which he refuted the claim that Indian 
Tribes lacked sovereign status. However, his argument derived from the fact that previous treaty 
engagements guaranteed their sovereignty, as opposed to their own personal identification or 
organization. Justice Thompson differed from Chief Justice Marshall’s view of sovereignty 
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which relied on the law of nations and the commerce clause, and argued that the only relevant 
determinant of “whether the Cherokee Indians are to be considered a foreign state” was “the 
practice of our own government and the light in which the Nation has been viewed and treated 
by it” (54). As such, he noted that: 
What is a treaty as understood in the law of nations? It is an agreement or contract 
between two or more nations or sovereigns, entered into by agents appointed for that 
purpose and duly sanctioned by the supreme power of the respective parties. And where 
is the authority, either in the Constitution or in the practice of the government, for 
making any distinction between treaties made with the Indian nations and any other 
foreign power? They relate to peace and war, the surrender of prisoners, the cession of 
territory, and the various subjects which are usually embraced in such contracts between 
sovereign nations. (60) 
 
While ultimately serving as a defense of tribal sovereignty, Justice’s Thompsons decision 
ultimately relied on external recognition as the basis of sovereignty, and provided no mention of 
tribal sovereignty originating from anything else. 
 
5.2.2. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty in Supreme Court Opinions 
 Not every Supreme Court opinion defined sovereignty in terms of external recognition or 
treaty terms. For example, the opinions of both Chief Justice Marshall and Justice McLean in 
Worcester v. Georgia that Indian tribes had some right to self-governance over their peoples and 
lands. Justice McLean in his concurring opinion responded to the argument that Indian tribes 
necessarily sacrificed their sovereignty as an entirety when entering into treaties that placed them 
under the protection of the United States when he argued that: 
By various treaties, the Cherokees have placed themselves under the protection of the 
United States; they have agreed to trade with no other people, nor to invoke the 
protection of any other sovereignty. But such engagements do not divest them of the right 
of self-government, nor destroy their capacity to enter into treaties or compacts. (520) 
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Supreme Court opinions almost a century later maintained the same understanding of tribal 
sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler was a 1978 Supreme Court decision that addressed the 
question of whether or not an individual could be tried twice, once in a tribal court and once in 
an American federal court, or whether the double jeopardy clause applied given the overriding 
sovereignty of the United States. In the opinion of the court, Justice Stewart seems to indicate 
that Indian tribes possess sovereign power that they can then divest to other foreign powers. 
Justice Stewart notes that “our cases recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up their full 
sovereignty.” If a tribe does not divest that power in a treaty, they retain that sovereign power: 
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists 
only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress 
acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those 
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary 
result of their dependent status. (323).\ 
 
In making this statement, Stewart affirmed the doctrine of “dual sovereignty” by explicitly 
drawing a distinction between the tribal courts and federal courts as belonging to the “arms of 
separate sovereigns (330).  
 Both of these sets of decisions point to the role of treaties in circumscribing or limiting 
Native sovereignty, but not defining Native sovereignty in its entirety. While these decisions do 
not contain passages that have intent to define tribal sovereignty as inherent, they did refer to 
there being some powers inherent in sovereignty held by the tribes that was not removed by 
treaties. As such, these decisions leave open the possibility of pointing to holes in the law that 
allow for articulating notions of inherent tribal sovereignty and self-definition. However, such 
holes are small, as these decisions also lay the precedent for the overwhelming and overriding 
sovereignty of the United States that circumscribes many of the practical aspects of exercising 
tribal sovereignty in terms of internal political affairs.  
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5.3. Deployment of Problematic Terms 
 While both Supreme Court opinions and the Native texts frequently used similar 
vocabularies and definitions of sovereignty, both sets of texts contained few instances with intent 
to define that defined sovereignty as problematic because of its philosophical legacy and history. 
It is perhaps unreasonable to expect Supreme Court opinions, which are targeted at answering 
very specific legal questions. However, these Supreme Court opinions also included quite a bit of 
extraneous information and background, as well as legal precedent in dicta (statements in court 
decisions that are not binding but considered authoritative for future decisions). While Chief 
Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh took the time to trace an extended history of the 
application of the discovery doctrine in the interactions between Great Britain, France, and Spain 
in the Americas, and how the principles of European sovereignty allowed for exclusive claims to 
land acquisition, there was no mention of the historical origin or even meaning of European 
sovereignty, nor discussion of whether it was appropriate to consider Indian political 
organization in terms of sovereignty.  
One may be led to ask why would these authors risk usage of that vocabulary instead of 
establishing their own terms from which to launch their political advocacy and critique. If Porter 
is correct that there are radical differences between colonial and colonized views of sovereignty 
and political governance, there is a reasonable concern that such political language is always 
already tainted by American epistemes. As Rifkin notes, some scholars reject the paradigm of 
sovereignty entirely because it relies on particular understandings of power and dominance that 
they understand to be inherently harmful to Native peoples or because sovereignty as a political 
aspiration carries particular beliefs and practices that are fundamentally European and limit the 
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potential of Native political thinking (2009, 91-94; 108-109). Native peoples face what Endres 
describes as a “catch-22 where have to accept the limited notion of sovereignty granted through 
federal law in their quest for more rights within Indian Law” (2009, 44). Some pessimistically 
argue that the result of invoking the language of sovereignty before American law is a patchwork 
of convoluted cases that defines Indian tribes as “quasi-sovereign,” such as in Oliphant v. The 
Suquamish Indian Tribe (208). 
The answer is neither simple nor consistent throughout each text. However, there is some 
acknowledgment in the works of Barker, Coffey and Tsosie, and others that it is necessary to 
occupy the language of sovereignty strategically. These authors do not use these terms neutrally 
or haphazardly and frequently criticize other indigenous authors who do. Barker, for example, 
criticizes authors who rely on the “taken-for-granted” and essentialist conception of sovereignty 
as if it is always appropriate or always understood in a particular way, “without a consideration 
of the ways in which its ideological origins might predispose a distortion or negation of 
indigenous epistemologies of law and governance” (2005, 20-21). These authors engage in a 
cautious project of trying to translate Native political views into the language of American case 
law, while simultaneously acknowledging its limits. As Barker continues: 
… sovereignty carries the horrible stench of colonialism. It is incomplete, inaccurate, and 
troubled. But it has also been rearticulated to mean altogether different things by 
indigenous peoples. In its link to concepts of self-determination and self-government, it 
insists on the recognition of inherent rights to the respect for political afﬁliations that are 
historical and located and for the unique cultural identities that continue to ﬁnd meaning 
in those histories and relations. (2005, 26) 
 
This is especially true in the face of ambiguous and flexible legal concepts such as “quasi-
sovereignty.” Some authors have noted that the outright abandonment of these terms for those 
which are more “user-friendly,” such as “self-determination” or “cultural autonomy” does not 
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resolve the issue of their legal status. Instead, it is a necessity to appeal to the Western lexicon of 
sovereignty because it is language that can be read against the legal precedents and which 
resonates with those in the international community (Cobb 2005, 122).  
 
5.4. The Role of Contingency 
 Given these differences in usages of sovereignty, the final notable trend this study will 
consider is the role of historical contingency in defining sovereignty not because a plurality of 
indigenous authors emphasized this role when SCOTUS did not but because only one indigenous 
author, Barker, explicitly defines sovereignty as “historically contingent.” The question that 
arises is whether or not other indigenous authors, and even if Supreme Court decisions, lend 
themselves to conceptualizing sovereignty as a contingent phenomenon that is has “no fixed 
meaning” (Barker 2005, 21).  
 Supreme Court opinions seem to rely on the opposite logic in viewing sovereignty by the 
very fact that Supreme Court opinions tend towards the principle of stare decisis; namely to rely 
on previous legal precedents. This principle would seem to imply that Indigenous sovereignty 
would be understood within American case law in a fixed manner; namely, that trial sovereignty 
can always be overridden by the sovereignty of the United States if necessary because previous 
treatise divested Native peoples of most sovereign powers. Each of the court decisions examined 
built on previous decisions.  
 It is difficult to draw the conclusion from only five Supreme Court decisions that United 
States legal interpretations of sovereignty do not shift within the court. It would be necessary to 
code other important Supreme Court decisions to provide a more accurate tracing of tribal 
sovereignty throughout Supreme Court decisions. That being said, this study found the Supreme 
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Court opinions did not explicitly define tribal sovereignty, or sovereignty writ large, as 
historically defined in the sense of changing throughout history due to factors external to the law. 
To borrow the language of Barker, the Supreme Court Justices did not seem to define 
sovereignty as emerging from specific cultural, social, and political locations of contestation and 
competing political agendas (2005, 21). Instead, the contestations and controversies brought 
before the court were filtered through a very particular narrative of Indigenous sovereignty as 
possessing some powers prior to engagement with the United States, but which were almost 
entirely ceded by treaty obligations such that a “trust doctrine” could be established that allowed 
the federal government overriding authority and pre-emption. Even in cases that explicitly 
clarified that Indian tribes retained aspects of sovereignty, those were “carved out” in the sense 
that they were defined only in terms of not being taken away by treaties, not existing in spite of 
them.  
 These interpretations and Court opinions also do not define sovereignty in any multi-
faceted way by acknowledging that there might be multiple interpretations of “sovereignty.” 
Instead, cases like Worcester v. Georgia use sovereignty as a neutral concept with certain powers 
contained therein, from which the Court must determine if those powers had been ceded by the 
tribes or not. In contrast, indigenous thinkers like Porter explicitly reject the idea of a “one size 
fits all” understanding of sovereignty that is the baseline for legal interpretation (2002, 101).  
Thus, there is potentially an important distinction between the American and Indian conceptions 
of sovereignty rooted in the very possibility of its changing meaning, as opposed to always 
relying on historical referents.  
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6. Conclusions 
 In undergoing a grounded theory analysis of select Native political texts and Supreme 
Court opinions, this study found major differences in the usage and definition of “sovereignty” 
between texts by Indian political theorists and major Supreme Court decisions that all sought to 
define the term. While the ability to generalize this finding beyond the number of texts analyzed 
is limited given the nature and scope of this qualitative analysis, this study does point to the 
importance of considering that there are unconsidered gaps in meanings of sovereignty that have 
major consequences for the relationship between tribal nations and the United States. These 
differences included defining culture in terms of sovereignty, emphasis on internal or external 
definitions of political sovereignty, the acknowledgment of problematic nature of particular 
terms and their historical origins, as well as differences in how sovereignty is defined as 
contingent or not. 
 
6.1. Future Research 
 Future research could draw upon and improve this study by expanding the number of 
texts analyzed to include other Indian political texts, such as more Supreme Court decisions that 
include some mention of the scope or aspects of tribal sovereignty. For example, a grounded 
theory approach could be applied to United States v. Kagama (1886), United States v. Sandoval 
(1913), Montana v. United States (1981), Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982), Duro v. 
Reina (1990), or Nevada v. Hicks (2001). These texts all include at least some mention of tribal 
sovereignty, but were not included in this study because my review of the literature did not point 
to these as major of cases from which to analyze the United States traditional of legal definitions 
of tribal sovereignty.  
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In addition, future research could expand beyond merely coding for definitions of 
“sovereign” and “sovereignty” to analyze broader historical trends of how tribal governance and 
political authority is understood in Supreme Court decisions that lack explicit mention of tribal 
sovereignty. For example, Native authors such as Barker, Kickingbird, and Porter identified 
other significant Supreme Court cases such as Ex Parte Crow Dog (1883) or Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock (1903) which were not included in this study because the term “sovereign” did not 
appear within them. The benefit of this expansion would be to see if there are more implicit 
definitions of tribal sovereignty, akin to the “unspoken assumptions” that the Oliphant decision 
held were a sufficient legal basis to divest certain sovereign powers from tribal nations. 
 Alternatively, a grounded theory approach could include legal texts addressing the 
sovereignty of other indigenous populations both within the United States as well as abroad. As 
this study only examined the views of indigenous populations within the continental United 
States, texts from both Native scholars as well as legal document that address the sovereignty of 
Native Hawaiians or Alaskan Native tribal entities or corporations could be included. Documents 
addressing the sovereignty or political authority of Aboriginal Australians, the First Nations of 
Canada, or the Māori of New Zealand might also prove fruitful for a grounded theory analysis.  
Analyzing similarities and differences in definitions of sovereignty between Native scholars of 
different historical traditions and locations might point to the unique role that various histories 
play in shaping conceptions of sovereignty. 
 
6.2. Policy Recommendations 
 The findings of this study lend themselves to a multitude of possible directions for future 
policymaking, both sweeping and smaller in nature. As previously mentioned, the recognition of 
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the significance and political legitimacy of oral tradition can greatly alter how government 
figures interpret the terms and legacy of treaty obligations between the United States and tribal 
nations. The impact of this inclusion is well beyond the scope of this thesis, especially as that 
oral tradition is not easily accessible by researchers, but instead would require significant 
dialogue between government officials of both governments in what Coffey and Tsosie identify 
as an explicitly bilateral process (2001, 204).  
 On a smaller scale, the fact that this study at least points to the possibility of differences 
in conceptualizing tribal sovereignty in other political documents and texts suggests the 
importance of greater dialogue with tribal nations before other government reforms with tribal 
nations to ensure that the specific needs of tribal nations are met as well as ensuring the terms of 
their engagement is not over-determined by American views (Harding et al. 2012, 6-10). 
Different tribal nations have different needs, such as wanting increased or decreased federal 
involvement in their affairs, or differing views on whether their tribal nation actually agreed to 
the trust doctrine in contrast to Supreme Court decisions that lead to sweeping political doctrines 
that apply to all tribal nations (Smith 2005, 115-116).  
 More significantly, this study raises the importance of considering that policies passed by 
the United States might be written in the language of increase tribal sovereignty and self-
determination, and thus employing a shared political vocabulary with the demands of Native 
peoples, but having a very different conception of sovereignty in mind. These gaps in 
conceptions of sovereignty can produce policy consequences that are very different than what 
Native peoples intended, as illustrated by modern policy failures such as questions of property 
rights for energy reform (Royster 2012, 117-120). Many authors have suggested particular policy 
reforms to address some of the material conditions of Native peoples that result from current 
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interpretations of their sovereignty. These policy reforms include: listing Tribal Nations within 
the United Nations Decolonization Committee or United Nations Trusteeship System 
(Eaglewoman 2012, 706), reforming laws related to tribal property ownership and trust status to 
allow greater control over its use for projects such as renewable energy (Royster 2012, 135-137), 
allowing tribal nations to pursue restructuring of their governments to have greater control over 
practical governance operations (Porter 1997, 93-95), and other practices. 
Any specific reform might be improved by including dialogue with tribal communities 
and analysis of what is meant when a particular population demands a measure to increase their 
sovereignty. As grounded theory is frequently applied to documents such as interview or meeting 
transcripts, this could also be applied within the policy process to code and examine in greater 
detail the meaning of demands by tribal nations while employing a method to minimize external 
interpretation (Charmaz 2005, 510-514). This is not to represent grounded theory as a panacea 
for current political struggles nor as a window to perfectly look at indigenous meaning and 
intent, as neither is possible within grounded theory (Smith 2005, 114-116). Instead, this study 
suggests that grounded theory, or at least willingness to consider the frames under which claims 
of sovereignty are made, is an important supplement to legal analysis to account for the 
complexities and historical legacies that produce the current conditions of tribal sovereignty. 
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